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ARTICLE
BAD DECISIONS MAKE BAD DECISIONS: DAVIS,
ARLINE, AND IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE
UNDUE FINANCIAL BURDEN DEFENSE UNDER
THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT*
t
Armen H. Merjian

Is ADA affordable? Equality affordable in America? Would this
question be asked about black, Hispanic, or Jewish people? The very
question reveals an unconscious assumption of inequality. The very
question demonstrates most dramatically the absolute necessity for
a national mandate of equality. Not since the abolition of slavery
has the principle of equality been negotiable for money in the
United States of America.
But, yes, there is always the responsibility to implement
equality as affordable as possible. ADA is not only affordable, we
literally cannot afford not to have it. It is the status quo
discrimination and segregation that are unaffordable, that are
preventing persons with disabilities from becoming self-reliant, and
and moral
that are driving us inevitably towards an economic
1
disaster of giant, paternalistic welfare bureaucracy.
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1 Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st
Cong. 19 (1989) (statement of Mr. Dart), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET
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INTRODUCTION

This is the story of how unfounded dictum was turned into
a "well-established principle," twisted into controlling language, and used generically by courts and advocates to limit
erroneously the rights of the disabled2 in ways Congress never
intended. In the 1979 case of Southeastern Community College
v. Davis ("Davis"),' Justice Stevens mentioned undue financial
burdens in an unsupported, passing dictum. The notion that
undue financial burdens could constitute a general defense to a
claim of discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act4 was wholly unsupported in the statute, in its legislative
history, and in its implementing regulations. Indeed, all of
these support the conclusion that no such defense is generally
available. Eight years later, however, in School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline ("Arline"),5 Justice Brennan
elevated this passing and unfounded comment to the status of
a well-established principle, albeit in dictum and in a footnote.
Again, the Court's comments with regard to financial burden
were wholly without support.
In passing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(the "ADA), 6 Congress clearly rejected the limitation "established" in Davis and Arline, save in a few discrete circumstances. Nevertheless, in yet a further compounding of errors, advocates and courts alike continue to assert a general defense
based upon undue financial burden under the ADA. In doing
so, they misread the applicable regulations, misinterpret section 504 and the ADA as identical (despite their divergent
histories and language), and continue to cite Davis and Arline
for propositions that these cases do not support.
As this Article was being prepared, the Supreme Court
ruled for the first time on the issues of cost under Title II of
2 This Article will use the currently-preferred terminology when referring to
disabilities, as described by Robert L. Burgdorf, except when quoting original materials. See Robert L. Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 413, 414 n.7 (1991).
3 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
4 Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1985 and Supp. 1998)).
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
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the ADA in Olmstead v. Zimring.7 Rather than correcting the
litany of interpretive errors preceding its decision, the Court
again compounded the errors. Indeed, the Court cited neither
Davis nor Arline; instead, the Court cited the wrong enacting
regulations to establish a cost-based defense where Congress
8
explicitly directed that none should exist.
It is hoped that the analysis provided in this Article will
help to restore to the disabled the frll protections that Congress intended in passing both section 504 and the ADA. This
will not be easy. The error of Justice Brennan in Arline has
been compounded by numerous circuit and district courts and
was incorporated by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") in 1984
in drafting its own implementing regulations? Advocates and
courts, therefore, face the daunting task of weeding through
layers of precedent built upon unsupported precedent, which
now includes the unequivocally flawed but formidable decision
in Olmstead.
Advocates, moreover, must convince increasingly overburdened courts to examine carefully the relevant Congressional
history and implementing regulations to demonstrate, for example, that the law applies different standards to new versus
existing facilities and to employers versus universities and
schools. Finally, advocates must prevail upon the courts not to
view section 504 and the ADA as interchangeable. As we shall
see, whatever the arguments under section 504, Congress expressly rejected the undue burdens defense under the ADA,
except in limited, clearly enumerated circumstances.

No. 98-536, 1999 WL 407380 (U.S. June 22, 1999).
See discussion infra Part IV.
9 In 1984, when the Department of Justice ("DOJ") adopted this dictum into
its regulations, many commentators wrote the DOJ to object to this codification of
error. See infra Section I.C.l.a. In addition, a leading commentator persuasively
argued this very point shortly after the Arline decision. See Timothy M. Cook, The
Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under
Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1471 (1987) [hereinafter
Cook(I)]. Unfortunately, these arguments were largely ignored, as was this
commentator's subsequent, well-reasoned assertion that "Congress determined that
the benefits of integration far outweighed the costs of compliance with the ADA."
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 457-65 (1991) [hereinafter Cook(II)]. By comprehensively tracing the genesis of the present folly from the bills leading up to the Rehabilitation
Act to the most recent cases under the ADA, this article may assist courts and
advocates to realize, and to amend, the error of their interpretation.
7
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Fortunately, overwhelming evidence demonstrates
Congress' rejection of cost as a defense to most claims under
the statutes. This Article seeks to marshall that evidence,
examining the relevant authority chronologically and sequentially to achieve greater clarity. Part I examines section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. Section I.A. analyzes the language of
the statute itself and its legislative history. The analysis demonstrates that Congress intended a broad, aggressive construction, precluding a general and constricting defense based upon
undue financial burden. Section I.B. reviews the regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare that implement section 504. Section I.C. analyzes the
Supreme Court cases of Davis and Arline, which spawned the
defense of "undue financial and administrative burdens." This
section reveals that the Court neither possessed nor cited any
basis for its comments regarding undue financial and administrative burdens.
Part II examines Title II of the ADA. Section II.A. looks at
the language and legislative history of Title II, in which Congress eschewed the Supreme Court's interpretation in Davis
and expressly limited the undue financial burden defense under the statute. Section II.B. reviews the regulations promulgated by the DOJ to implement Title II, which reflect
Congress' intentions in this regard. Part III then provides an
analysis of several recent cases in which various courts have
continued to misread the case law, statutes, and regulations,
resulting in the misapplication of the undue burdens defense.
Finally, Part IV briefly examines the Supreme Court's most
recent decision in Olmstead, which, like the cases discussed in
Part III, simply got it wrong. A brief Conclusion follows.
I. THE REHABILITATION ACT
A. The Statute
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Act") represented the
first major piece of civil rights legislation for the disabled."°

10See, e.g., RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CML RIGHTs 3 (1984)

("Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has been hailed as the first major
civil rights legislation for disabled people."); Sharon Rennert, All Aboard: Accessible
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The primary purpose of the Act was to improve the delivery by
states of federally-subsidized vocational rehabilitation services
2
to disabled individuals." Section 504 of the Act, however,
sweepingly prohibits discrimination against the disabled by
recipients of federal funding." The section broadly proclaims
that the disabled shall not be "excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . ...""
Although the significance of this section is now well
known, it is unclear whether, in passing the Act, Congress
fully appreciated its scope. Section 504 was inconspicuously
inserted into the Act rather late in the process, "joined to three
unrelated sections dealing with problems facing handicapped
people outside the specific context of rehabilitation programs." 5 Perhaps as a result, it appears to have generated no
Public Transportation for Disabled Persons, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 360, 366 (1988)
(referring to Section 504 as 'a civil rights mandate."); Ronald Bruce Hauben, Note,
A Campus Handicap? Disabled Students and the Right to Higher Education-Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
163, 163-64 (1979-80).
" See SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 3 ("This law provided for the continuation of
the vocational rehabilitation program first established by the Smith-Fess Act of
1920, under which federal financial assistance was given to the states for vocational and other services to disabled people."); Mark F. Engebretson, Administrative
Action to End Discrimination Based on Handicap: HEWs Section 504 Regulation,
16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 61 (1979); Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue Hardship:
Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 114 n.9
(1990) ("The original purpose of the Rehabilitation Act was to provide research,
training and vocational rehabilitation services to prepare the handicapped for employment, independence and self-sufficiency.") (citation omitted); see also School Bd.
of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.3 (1987) ("The primary focus of
the 1973 Act was to increase federal support for vocational rehabilitation ... .
12 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985 & Supp. 1998). It reads, in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States .. . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id.
Id See id.
14 Id.
" Engebretson, supra note 11, at 61; accord SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 49 ("As
it was initially drafted, the legislation did not include Section 504. Nor was Section 504 suggested at any of the hearings held on the proposed law. Rather, the
section was conceived by Senate committee staff members and added to the bill at
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controversy or debate in Congress 16 or among the general
public. 7 As originally enacted, section 504 contained but a
single sentence," with no indication of how its general pronouncement was to be implemented and interpreted.19 Unlike
most legislation, and unlike the other provisions of the Act itself, Congress did not provide for the promulgation of implementing regulations for section 504.20 Compounding this prob-

a relatively late point in the legislative process."); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY:
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHT MOVEMENT 65 (1993)
("Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was no more than a legislative
afterthought."); Brandfield, supra note 11, at 116 ("Staff members developed it late
in the drafting of the Act out of concern that discrimination by employers would
block the vocational rehabilitation of the handicapped.").
16 See SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 4 ("The legislative history of P.L. 93-112 indicates that Section 504 had no special significance at this point in its evolution.
The section was not discussed in any of the hearings held prior to the law's passage, nor was it discussed when the bill was considered on the floors of the House
and Senate. There was no public debate on the provision, and the lengthy House
and Senate reports on P.L. 93-112 refer only briefly to Section 504 . . .");
SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 65 ("There had been no hearings and no debate about
section 504."); Rosalie V. Murphy, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment
Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 64 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1607, 1616 (1991) ("There was no legislative discussion or debate concerning
section 504, nor was it explained in the reports accompanying the Rehabilitation
Act.").
17 See, e.g., SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 57 (Section 504 "was an initiative of
liberal congressional staff and not done at the request, suggestion, or demand of
outside groups."); SHAPRO, supra note 15, at 65 ("Professional and charitable
groups representing disabled people were sophisticated in winning multibilliondollar federal funding, but had not focused on civil rights legislation."); Steven B.
Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial
Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 391, 407 n.64 (1995) ("Even most groups concerned with disability issues did
not take note of section 504 at the time of its enactment.").
"8 The original sentence is quite similar to the current first sentence of Section
504: "No otherwise handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
Section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1985 & Supp. 1998)); see SCOTCH supra note 10, at 4 ("At the end of the law was
an apparently minor section, Section 504, consisting of one sentence . .
").
"' See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 16, at 1616 ("The text of the statute itself
provides no indication of what was meant by discrimination or whether equal
treatment alone would be considered sufficient to eliminate discrimination.");
Engebretson, supra note 11, at 60 ("Section 504 as enacted by the Congress contained no indication of how its provisions were to be implemented.").
20 See, SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 60-61 ("Unlike the rest of the Rehabilitation
Act and most other federal legislation, Section 504 contained no provision for its
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lem, virtually no contemporaneous legislative history exists
with which to divine Congress' intent in passing section 504.21
These facts are crucial to the analysis, for section 504's
22
indeterminate language and lack of legislative history left it

own implementation. That is, Congress did not express its intentions as to which
agency was to carry out the law, whether regulations were to be issued, and exactly who was to be subject to them."); Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected:
Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
26 TULSA L.J. 1, 16 (1990) ("This statute as originally adopted did not contain any
provisions calling for Federal agencies to promulgate implementing regulations.");
Engebretson, supra note 11, at 63 ("No authority is delegated to any agency to
promulgate or enforce regulations under the Act.").
21 See SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 53 ("The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act contains only passing references to Section 504, stating simply that the
section prohibits discrimination, without providing any rationale or predicting any
impact."); Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV.
997, 1002 (1984) [hereinafter Employment Discrimination] ("there is scant legislative history"); Engebretson, supra note 11, at 63 ("The complete absence of any
legislative history for section 504 compounds the uncertainty created by the lack of
statutory elaboration. The anti-discrimination provision passed without generating
a written comment."); Epstein, supra note 17, at 407 n.64 (Section 504 "was also
Indeed, not a
enacted without any definitive legislative history or guidance ....
word about this section was uttered by a single member of Congress in any of the
hearings or floor debates which preceded its enactment."); see also infra notes 1516 and accompanying text. It appears, in fact, that there are only two references
to Section 504 in the legislative history of the Act, neither of which is instructive
on the issue of cost as a defense under the Act. Compare Engebretson, supra note
11, at 63 n.17 ("The only mention of any proposal related to § 504 appears in the
1972 Senate hearings," wherein a student with cerebral palsy "incorporated a copy
of his senior thesis in which he discussed the possibility of amending Title VI to
prohibit discrimination based on handicap.") with Epstein, supra note 17, at 408
(explaining that the "only reference to § 504 in the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act was an eloquent statement from a representative of the National
Federation of the Blind at a subcommittee hearing."). As set forth below, however,
legislative history preceding and following enactment of section 504 supports the
assertion that Congress intended no general defense to a claim under section 504
based upon cost. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
has explicitly recognized the importance of this legislative history in interpreting
section 504. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
22 Cook suggests that, in fact, the legislative history of the Act demonstrates
that Congress enacted section 504 "with full knowledge of the substantial burdens
it would entail," but provided no waiver for such burdens. Cook(II), supra note 9,
at 460 n.443. Cook argues, "The legislative history of § 504 demonstrates
Congress's belief that the evil of segregation and exclusion would economically and
morally outweigh the financial burdens of integrating persons with disabilities." Id.
For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see Cook(I), supra note 9, at
1472-79. None of the quotations upon which the author relies, however, was made
with specific reference to section 504. In particular, Cook relies upon the statements made by Senator Humphrey and Representative Vanik in connection with
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to administrative agencies and the courts to establish the parameters of its anti-discrimination mandate." It should be

bills that they introduced predating the Act. These bills were certainly similar to,
and apparently the genesis of, what would become section 504. Compare Cook(I),
supra note 9, at 1473 n.11 ("Section 504 originated in these bills . . . ."), and
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 n.13 ("The principle underlying these
bills was reshaped in the next Congress and inserted as § 504 into . . . legislation
then pending. Senator Humphrey and Representative Vanik indicated that the
intent of the original bill had been carried forward into § 504."), with SCOTCH,
supra note 10, at 57 (suggesting that section 504 "was an initiative of liberal congressional staff" and that the language was drafted by congressional staff during a
meeting in late August 1972, based upon earlier civil rights statutes). However,
"[no hearings were held on the bills, ...
and neither was brought to a vote in
committee or on the floor of either house." SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 44. In addition, "President Nixon's veto of two earlier versions of the Act in 1972 and 1973
further obscured discussion of the implications of section 504." Engebretson, supra
note 11, at 64. Cook's argument is quite persuasive for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that in the discussions leading up to the Act in general, Congress explicitly discussed the subject of costs yet provided no cost defense anywhere in the
statute. See Cook(II), supra note 9, at 460 n.443; Cook(I), supra note 9, at 147279; see also 119 CONG. REC. 6497 (statement of Sen. Percy) ("But people are more
important than cost."). Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court has
stated, "[gliven the lack of debate devoted to § 504 in either the House or Senate
when the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973 . . . the intent with which Congressman Vanik and Senator Humphrey crafted the predecessor to § 504 is a
primary signpost on the road toward interpreting the legislative history of § 504."
Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 n.13; accord School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 282 n.9. As Cook explains, an examination of the sponsor's intent supports the conclusion that "Congress desired that the costs of compliance with section 504 would not outweigh the right to meaningful access to federal and federally assisted programs." Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1525.
' See Employment Discrimination,supra note 21, at 999 ("The provision's indeterminate language devolves responsibility for policy choice on courts and administrative agencies and leaves them to make ad hoc selections from among competing conceptions of discrimination."); Cook(II), supra note 9, at 415 ("[Slection
504 . . . was but a single sentence tacked on to vocational rehabilitation legislation. Clarification of its meaning was left largely to the Judiciary and Executive.");
42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1998)) (statement
of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"),
introducing HEW's regulations implementing section 504) [hereinafter Califano
Statement] ("The very general language of section 504 itself and the scant legislative history surrounding its enactment provide little guidance as to how these
complex issues should be resolved."); see also Rhode Island Handicapped Action
Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transp. Auth., 718 F.2d 490, 494 (1st Cir. 1983)
("Because [section 504] is both ambiguous and lacking in specifics, its scope and
effect have been an enigma since [it] was enacted."). Some authors have even
suggested that Congress may not have had any specific intention at all in enacting section 504. See, e.g., SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 53 ("[Tlhere is little in the
record to suggest what, if anything, members of Congress had in mind when Section 504 was enacted.") (emphasis added); Employment Discrimination,supra note
21, at 1002 ("In sum, the statute is open ended; indeed, it is even possible that
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noted, however, that the plain language of the statute supports
an expansive and uncompromising interpretation of the mandate.24 Indeed, the statute-like the civil rights statutes on
which it was modeled--provides no defense to charges of dis26
crimination based on "undue financial burdens."
This argument is buttressed by the fact that Congress
expressly included an exception that permits exclusion of individuals who are not "otherwise qualified." 2' As one commentator has observed, "although Congress deliberately allowed
exclusion based on handicap-related inability, it included no
to permit exclusion based on handisimilar express exception
28
cap-related costs."
This argument is also supported by the 1974 amendments
to the Act.29 In 1974, Congress amended the Act, revising the
definition of the term "handicapped individual."" Specifically,
Congress did not have an 'intent.'").
24 See Judith Welch Wegner, The AntidiscriminationModel Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 450 (1984) (noting that, in the
absence of legislative history, "[tihe terse language of section 504 itself must therefore provide the principal guidance" on the issue of cost as a defense under Section 504).
' These include Title VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)) and Title IX (20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1990)).

See S. REP. NO.

1297 at 39-40 (1974), reprinted in

1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390 ("Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical
to, the anti-discrimination language of [Title VI and Title IXI."); Arline, 480 U.S.
at 278 n.2 ("Congress' decision to pattern § 504 after Title VI is evident in the
language of the statute .

. . .");

Califano Statement, supra note 23 ("The language

of section 504 is almost identical to the comparable nondiscrimination provisions of
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and title IX of the Education amendments
of 1972 . . . ."); Engebretson, supra note 11, at 61-62 ("The language of section

504 parallels that of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," and "also tracks the anti-discrimination provision of Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972."); Wegner, supra note 24, at 404 n.5 ("As
originally enacted, the text of § 504 was closely modeled after other federal civil
rights provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, and sex."). Neither Title VI nor Title IX contains any such exculpatory
language. See 42 U.S.C. § 20000(d) (1994); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West 1990); see
also infra note 184 and accompanying text.
26 See SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 3 ("The mandate was unequivocal, without
regard to cost or disruption to the recipients of federal funds."); Crespi, supra note
20, at 15 ("Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is couched in general terms and
does not specifically provide for an undue hardship defense.").
27 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985 and Supp. 1998).
28 Wegner, supra note 24, at 450.
29 See Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974).
"0The term is "individual with a disability" in the current version of the Act.
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Congress removed all references to employment to clarify that
the broad mandate of section 504 prevents discrimination
against all disabled individuals seeking services from federallyassisted programs, and not merely those seeking employment."' In the legislative history accompanying the 1974
amendments, Congress expressed its intention that section 504
be accorded the same broad and uncompromising construction
as other civil rights legislation:
Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of [Title VI and Title IX]. The section therefore constitutes the establishment of a broad government policy that
programs receiving federal financial assistance shall be operated
without discrimination on the basis of handicap. 2

This legislative history is particularly relevant in light of
the Supreme Court's ruling that "as virtually contemporaneous
and more specific elaborations of the general norm that Congress had enacted into law the previous year, the [1974]
amendments and their history do shed significant light on the
intent with which § 504 was enacted."3 3 The clear intent evidenced by the amendments and their legislative history is that
section 504, like other civil rights legislation, is to be construed
broadly and aggressively to effectuate its anti-discriminatory
purposes.3 4
This intent is quite different from, and seem-

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985 and Supp. 1998).
31 See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1987);
Engebretson, supra note 11, at 64-65; Rennert, supra note 10, at 366 n.41.
32 S. REP. No. 1297 at 39-40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390;
see Engebretson, supra note 11, at 65 ("This peculiar after-the-fact legislative history . . .declared that Congress had intended section 504 to be an aggressive piece
of civil rights legislation.").
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 306 n.27 (1988).
'4 See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d
Cong. 224 (1974) ("[HEW] fully intends to treat Section 504 as civil rights legislation that is remedial in design and to construe the legislation broadly to effectuate
its purposes, to correct and alleviate conditions adversely affecting handicapped
individuals in federally-assisted programs."); Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1473 n.10
("Like Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, .. . whose language it
tracks, § 504 is to be accorded 'a sweep as broad as its language.'") (citing North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982)); Moreno v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 63 F.3d 1404, 1415 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[Slection 504 is a civil rights statute,
and as such, should be broadly construed.") (citations omitted); Niece v. Fitzner,
941 F. Supp. 1497, 1505 (E.D. Mich. 1996) ("It is a familiar canon of statutory
construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
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ingly incompatible with, the adoption of sweeping limitations
to section 504 based upon undue financial burden.
B. The Implementing Regulations
As the foregoing discussion indicates, section 504 contained no provisions calling for federal agencies to promulgate
implementing regulations.35 As a consequence, the first regulations, promulgated by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare ("HEW"), were not issued until April of 1977, four
years after the passage of the Act.3 6 Even then, the regulations were issued only after sit-ins in Washington and San
Francisco," a federal lawsuit to force promulgation, 8 a
change in presidential administrations, and an executive order
compelling promulgation of the regulations.3 9 On April 28,

purposes. This broad construction is also applied to civil rights statutes. Accordingly, a broad construction is given to both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.")
(citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1983) ("For language as broad as that of § 504
cannot be read in isolation from its history and purposes.") (citations omitted).
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
(codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1998));
" See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977)
see also SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 69.
' See SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 5; SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 68 ("The San
Francisco sit-in marked the political coming of age of the disability rights movement."); Engebretson, supra note 11, at 59; Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1481 ("The
disabled community had demonstrated at each of HEWs ten regional offices and
had occupied Secretary Califano's office for twenty-eight hours and the offices of
Region IX in San Francisco for twenty-two days.").
3 In 1975, advocates filed suit in federal court to compel HEW to promulgate
implementing regulations and enforce Section 504. In 1976, Judge John Smith of
the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in plaintiffs favor, finding
that "the statute's discrimination prohibitions were certainly not intended to be
self-executing," and that "Congress contemplated swift implementation of § 504
through a comprehensive set of regulations." Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp.
922, 924 (D.D.C. 1976); see Epstein, supra note 17, at 409 ("Section 504 sat idly
in the United States Code until the 1976 case of Cherry v. Mathews."). The court
did not, however, compel promulgation by a set date. See Cherry, 419 F. Supp. at
924 ("Rather than establish a date by which final regulations must issue, the
Court retains jurisdiction over this matter to assure that no further unreasonable
delays affect the promulgation of regulations under § 504.").
" See Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977). For a history of the events
leading to the promulgation of the regulations, see SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 6669.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 1

1976, President Ford issued Executive Order No. 11,914, directing HEW to promulgate regulations "to provide for consistent implementation within the Federal Government of Section
504 ....4o
The component agency of HEW charged with drafting the
regulations-and interpreting section 504's antidiscrimination
mandate-was the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"). 4' The regulations to be drafted by OCR would serve a crucial role in providing specific and concrete meaning to the general prohibition
contained in section 504.42 As we shall see, consistent with
the broad language of section 504, the final regulations provide
based upon cost only in very limited circumstanca defense
43
es.
In fact, it appears that if OCR had had its way, the regulations would not have included a cost defense at all. A leading
commentator on the promulgation of the HEW regulations
explained that OCR did not consider cost a factor in drafting
the regulations:
The OCR staff did not consider factors affecting recipients such as
cost, inconvenience, and disruption of existing programs to be legitimate reasons for failing to meet requirements of nondiscrimination ....Cost was not directly addressed in the draft regulation and
was officially a "nonissue," one whose consideration was felt to be
illegitimate by most of the OCR staff, including the key decisionmakers .... .4

Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977).
See SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 64; Brandfield, supra note 11, at 116; Epstein, supra note 17, at 408.
42 See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text; see also Engebretson, supra
note 11, at 67 (observing that the choice of OCR to promulgate the regulations
"was to have a great effect on the substantive content of the final HEW regulations").
4" SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 64, 75. An HEW report on the costs and benefits of the proposed regulations concluded:
[Tihe benefits forthcoming (psychic as well as pecuniary) provide a substantial offset to the costs that will be incurred. The costs involved will
not be as great as is widely thought and the compelling situation of
some of the handicapped persons involved tips the balance in favor of
proceeding with immediate implementation of the regulation.
Dave M. O'Neill, DiscriminationAgainst Handicapped Persons: The Costs, Benefits
and Inflationary Impact of Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 Covering Recipients of HEW FinancialAssistance, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,320 (1976).
40 Exec.
41
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Unlike section 504, however, the HEW regulations were controversial.45 Furthermore, unlike Congress in crafting the
very broad section 504, HEW was faced with the task of drafting individual regulations to fit several distinct factual contexts, i.e., to govern several different kinds of discrimination
claims.46 These included claims concerning employment practices; program accessibility; preschool, elementary, and secondary education; postsecondary education; and health, welfare,
and social services.4 As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
observed, "this extremely diverse factual reality makes simple,
universal rules impossible." 8 Accordingly, the law "assigns
different legal consequences to the costs of accommodation in
different societal areas."49 The failure of courts and advocates
alike to grasp this point is, as we shall see, a leading cause of
the confusion surrounding interpretation of the Act and the
ADA.50

45 See, e.g., SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 5 (referring to the regulations as "highly
controversial"); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM
OF INDrVIDUAL ABILIrIES 103 (1983) [hereinafter COMMISSION] (explaining that the
regulations regarding mass transit systems were "controversial"); Mark C. Weber,
Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 11 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM.& MARY L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1995) ("Although [section 5041
provoked no conflict-and, indeed, little attention-in Congress, a major battle nevertheless ensued over the promulgation of regulations enforcing it."). The proposed
rules provoked more than 700 written comments, and HEW held 22 public hearings on the rules. See id. at 1094.
46 See Califano Statement, supra note 23 ("The diversity of types of handicaps,
as well as the wide variety of settings in which programs financed by the Department are offered, make the task of prescribing general rules of nondiscriminatory
treatment a difficult one.").
'" See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-84.55 (1998); see also Wegner, supra note 24, at 41819 (noting that the regulations include "specific directives concerning actions recipients must take to avoid 'discrimination' in five distinct factual contexts").
'8 COMISSION, supra note 45, at 104.
49 COMISSION, supra note 45, at 103.
"oSee infra Parts III and IV.
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In the final regulations issued in 1977,"' then, OCR was
compelled to account for financial burden in limited circumstances:
While disregard of costs was a major tenet of faith within OCR,
inevitably some consideration of the financial burden for recipients
was made. Requiring program accessibility rather than access to all
parts of all facilities is the most important evidence of this, as were
the exemptions ultimately granted small service providers. However,
the Office for Civil Rights generally held to the doctrine that cost
52
was not a valid excuse for discrimination against disabled people.

51 The 1977 regulations governed only recipients of HEW grants. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.2 (1998). In January of 1978, however, pursuant to Executive Order No.
11,914, 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1977), HEW promulgated prototype regulations to be used
by all other federal agencies as a guideline for drafting their own regulations. 43
Fed. Reg. 2136 (1978) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.1-85.58 (1980)) (current version
at 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.58 (1997)). In 1979, following the division of HEW into two
new agencies, the Department of Education and the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS"), the HEW rule was recodified in identical form. See 34
C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.61 (1979). Meanwhile, in 1980, President Carter issued Executive Order No. 12,250, transferring responsibility for coordination of the section
504 rules to the Attorney General. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1981).
On August 11, 1981, the HEW prototype regulation was transferred (in identical
form) to 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.58. Finally, following issuance of the prototype regulation, 54 additional federal agencies have promulgated regulations pursuant to
section 504. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 409 n.75 (providing partial listing of
citations to federal agencies that have promulgated such regulations). Because "the
same interpretation of § 504 underlies both the HEW-specific rule and the HEW
prototype regulations," Rennert, supra note 10, at 371, and because HEW was
charged with promulgating the regulations hnplemcnting section 504, this article
cites only the HEW-specific rule.
52 SCOTCH, supra note 10, at 77. As HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano Jr.
stated in his explanatory comments to the new HEW regulations:
[Piroviding equal access to programs may involve major burdens on some
recipients. Those burdens and costs, to be sure, provide no basis for
exemption from section 504 of this regulation: Congress' mandate to end
discrimination is clear. But it is also clear that factors of burden and
cost had to be taken into account in the regulation in prescribing the
actions necessary to end discrimination and to bring handicapped persons
into full participation in federally financed programs and activities.
Califano Statement, supra note 23. As one commentator notes, "[a] cabinet
Secretary's explanation of a regulation, when accompanied by the regulation's final
promulgation is entitled to substantial deference, especially if the cabinet official
publishing the regulation is also responsible for administering the underlying statute." Cook(II), supra note 9, at 460 n.442 (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980)). The author also points out that '[the Supreme Court relied upon the explanatory comments of the Secretary of HEW accompanying the § 504 rule in three of its decisions." Id. (citations omitted).
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Like the ADA regulations that would follow,53 the regulations clearly distinguish between new and existing facilities in
the context of program accessibility. Specifically, the regulations "do[] not require a recipient to make each of its existing
facilities or every part of a facility accessible to and usable by
handicapped persons,"5 4 a partial concession to cost and burden. By contrast, the regulations plainly require that facilities
constructed after the effective date of the regulations be designed and constructed in such manner as to be "readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons."55
In addition, the regulations exempt recipients with fewer
than fifteen employees from complying with the mandates of
program accessibility if doing so would result in "a significant
alteration in its existing facilities."56 The clearest concession
to financial burden, however, and the only other such concession in the regulations, appears in the regulations governing
employment practices.57 These regulations provide that employers must "make reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations" of an "otherwise qualified"
disabled employee "unless the recipient can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its program."" The regulations then list three
factors to be used in determining whether an accommodation
would impose an undue burden upon an employer, including
"[t]he nature and cost of the accommodation needed."59
Although "reasonable accommodations" has become a generic term in disability law and is typically used "to describe
individualization of opportunities for handicapped people,""0 it

See infra Section II.B.
s'45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a) (1998).
Id. § 84.23(a).
' Id.
§ 84.22(c).
5 See id. §§ 84.11-84.14. It is, in fact, the only express concession to cost in
the regulations.
§ 84.12(a).
58 Id.
9 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)(3) (1998).
60 COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 103. The Commission describes "reasonable
accommodations" as "[a]djustments or modifications of opportunities to permit
handicapped people to participate fully." Id. The concept of reasonable accommodation "ispremised on the fact that society has been structured for the non-disabled"
and "serves the ultimate goal of integrating disabled people into the social mainstream." Rennert, supra note 10, at 372-73; see also Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504
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is important to note that the phrase, with its concomitant
defense of "undue hardship,"6 1 only refers to modifications in
the employment context.62 Hence, the exculpatory defense of
"undue hardship," with its consideration of "[tihe nature and
cost of the accommodation needed," does not appear anywhere
63
else in the regulations promulgated by HEW. Of particular
relevance to the analysis that follows, neither the "General
Provisions" prohibiting discrimination' nor the regulations
governing "Postsecondary Education"" provides any excuse or
66
defense based on cost or undue burden.
The HEW regulations provide the most comprehensive
interpretation of section 504 available and are of critical importance to interpreting section 504.67 As the Supreme Court
has explained, "considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
Such deference to administraentrusted to administer.. .,6.
of the RehabilitationAct After Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future,
4 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 884 (1989) ("In simplistic terms, the relationship between
the 'otherwise qualified' and 'reasonable accommodation' requirements under section
504 may be stated as follows: a handicapped individual is protected from discrimination under section 504 if he or she is able to perform in the job or program at
issue under existing conditions or with the provision of reasonable accommodation
by the employer or program administrator.").
61 Crespi, supra note 20, at 16 ("These HHS regulations [regarding employment
discrimination] were the genesis of the undue hardship concept and language.").
62 See COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 105 ("In its original sense, then, reasonable accommodation referred only to modifications on the job . .. ").
45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1998). See Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1516 ("This
undue hardship exception appears only in the employment subpart of the HEW
rule.").
64 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.10.
' Id. §§ 84.41-84.47; see Donald J. Olenick, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 179
(1980) ("The regulation appears to impose a greater obligation on post-secondary
educational institutions than upon employers to accommodate the handicapped.
Educational institutions are not subject to a reasonable accommodation/undue
hardship standard, as are employers; the implication is that cost is not a factor
with regard to statutorily authorized modifications by educational institutions.").
" The same is true of the regulations governing Preschool, Elementary, and
Secondary Education, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-84.39, and Health, Welfare, and Social
Services. See id. §§ 84.51-84.55.
67 See Wegner, supra note 24, at 417 (The HEW regulations "continue to provide one of the most comprehensive systematic interpretations of section 504, and,
therefore, warrant close examination.").
6 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984); accord Bragdon v. Abbot, No. 97-156, 1998 WL 332958, at *14
(U.S. June 25, 1998); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1983)
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rive construction is particularly important where, as here,
there is little other guidance available.69 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has expressly recognized the importance of the HEW
regulations. Although the Supreme Court initially indicated
that HEW's reluctance in drafting the regulations "substantially diminishes the deference to be given to HEW's present
0 the Court eventually recoginterpretation of the statute,""
nized that the regulations are "an important source of guidance on72 the meaning of § 504""' and "are of significant assistance."
The HEW regulations are also entitled to considerable
deference in light of Congress' actions in amending the Act in
1978. 7' Among other things, the 1978 amendments extended
the scope of section 504 to cover programs operated by federal
agencies and added a new section 505(a)(2), which provides
that "[tihe remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any

("This Court generally has deferred to contemporaneous regulations issued by the
agency responsible for implementing a congressional enactment.") (citation omitted);
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("In
interpreting the meaning of a statute, substantial deference is due the interpretation given its provisions by the agency charged with administering that statute.")
(citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994)).
"See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
ToSoutheastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 n.11 (1979); see
also Epstein, supra note 17, at 414 (stating that "in Davis the Court questioned
the validity of the HEW regulations"); Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination
and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1464 (1986) ("The contrast
between these two unanimous decisions of the Court ... are striking: Davis undertook only a limited analysis of the legislative history of the Act and minimized
the significance of the federal agency regulations, while Alexander explored
Congress' intent in some depth and gave great credence to federal agency interpretations."); Wegner, supra note 24, at 421 n.53 ("Because federal agencies were
initially reluctant to adopt regulations implementing § 504, however, courts have
accorded their administrative interpretation less deference.").
71 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985).
72 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987); accord
Bragdon, 1998 WL 332958, at *6; Darrone, 465 U.S. at 634. For an excellent discussion of the Supreme Court's evolving treatment of the HEW regulations, see
Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1504-10.
"' See Crespi, supra note 20, at 16 n.48 ("The Rehabilitation Act was subsequently amended in 1978 to require Federal agencies to promulgate such regulations as necessary to implement the amendments made to it by the Rehabilitation,
Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978.").
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person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any
recipient of Federal assistance or provider of such assistance
under section 504. "74
Assessing the legislative history of the 1978 amendments,
a leading commentator observed that in enacting the amendments, "Congress took ten discrete, legislative actions that
indicated its awareness and approval of the waiverless HEW
regulatory approach.""5 "[Tihe ten distinct provisions," the
author continues, "including section 504 coverage of the Executive, all of which suggested full congressional awareness of the
HEW regulation, were enacted with near unanimity, as they
had been earlier in the Senate."7 6 The Supreme Court itself,
moreover, subsequently recognized that "these [HEW] regulations were drafted with the oversight and approval of Congress"7 7 and that "the responsible congressional Committees
participated in their formulation, and both these Committees
and Congress itself endorsed the regulations in their final
form."" Under such circumstances, the HEW regulations,
with only a few discrete exceptions based upon cost, arguably
should have the force of law.79
The foregoing discussion provides the necessary statutory
and regulatory background to the Supreme Court's decisions in
1 As the discussion indicates, at the time
0 and Arline."
Davis"
of the Davis decision in 1979, there was no basis in law for a
general defense to a section 504 claim based upon undue financial burden. Neither Congress nor the agency charged with
implementing section 504 provided any general exemption or
defense based upon undue financial burden. In fact, quite the
opposite was true. Congress did not provide a cost-based de" Rehabilitation,

Comprehensive

Services,

and

Developmental

Disabilities

Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982, 2987 (1978).
" Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1510.
7r

Id. at 1500.

7 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).

" Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984). The Court also
noted, "[i]n adopting § 505(a)(2) in the amendments of 1978, Congress incorporated
the substance of the Department's [section 504] regulations into the statute." Id.
at 634 n.15; see Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1505-06 (arguing that the Supreme
view that the Congress had in the 1978 amendments
Court "adopted the ...
approved the HEW regulation.").
" See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
so 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
81 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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fense of any kind in its statute. In the HEW regulations interpreting the statute, which were ratified in 1978, HEW indicated that cost is generally not a defense to a discrimination
claim under section 504, apart from a few narrowly-tailored
exceptions. Thus, if the Supreme Court were to establish such
a limitation on the rights of the disabled, it would have to
construct it out of whole cloth. That is precisely what the
Court did.
C. The Supreme Court Cases:Davis and Arline
This section examines the two Supreme Court cases 2
that have created much of the confusion: Southeastern Community College v. Davis' and School Board of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline." As the discussion indicates, neither of
these cases required an examination of the issue of cost in
assessing the plaintiffs discrimination claim. 5 And, indeed,
neither case examined the issue. In a footnote, however, Arline
elevated to the status of "well established" doctrine a passing,
unsupported comment in Davis regarding "undue financial and
administrative burdens."8 6 The deleterious effects of this error
continue to be felt."
1. Southeastern Community College v. Davis
Davis presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to issue a comprehensive ruling on the Act, six years after
its passage." Unfortunately, Davis was a poor "test case" for
advocates seeing an expansive reading of the Act. 9 As we
82

For the sake of brevity, with regard to the Act, this Article focuses upon the

Supreme Court decisions in Davis and Arline, which provide the basis for the
undue burdens defense examined herein, rather than lower court cases which
either predate or merely compound the error of the Court.
8
442 U.S. 397 (1979).
84 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
,' See infra notes 116, 121, 171, and 183 and accompanying text.
8G See infra Section I.C.2.
See infra Parts III, IV.
Information, 28 C.F.R. § 39.103
88 See Department of Justice, Supplementary
(1998) ("The Davis decision was the Supreme Court's first comprehensive view of
Section 504, a major new civil rights statute.").
89 See, e.g., Hauben, supra note 10, at 174 ("The holding in Davis, that Southeastern was not required to admit Davis to the Nursing Program, is reasonable
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shall see, the plaintiff's case was relatively weak, which contributed to the unanimous decision in the defendant's favor.'
This may explain why Justice Powell's confusing and mistaken
assertions regarding "affirmative action," 1 and his unwarranted allusion to undue financial burdens,92 elicited neither
dissent nor concurrence from Justices Brennan and Marshall.9 3
The plaintiff, Francis B. Davis, sought admission to the
Associate Degree Nursing Program of Southeastern Community College ("Southeastern"). Although Ms. Davis had a severe
hearing impairment, she was an "excellent lip reader" and was
"skillful in communicating with other people" as long as she
wore a hearing aid and was allowed to see the person speaking
to her. 4 Southeastern nonetheless rejected her application on
the grounds that her severe hearing impairment would prevent
her from completing her training and being licensed as a Registered Nurse.
At trial, the district court, crediting the testimony of
Southeastern's expert, stated:
[I]n many situations such as an operation room intensive care unit,
or post-natal care unit, all doctors and nurses wear surgical masks
which would make lip reading impossible. Additionally, in many
situations a Registered Nurse would be required to instantly follow
the physician's instructions concerning procurement of various types
of instruments and drugs where the physician would be unable to
5
get the nurse's attention by other than vocal means."

given the extreme facts of the case."); Rennert, supra note 10, at 380 n.164 (noting that the facts "made Davis an unsympathetic case for requiring accommodation
and could be seen as limiting the applicability of the holding"); Wegner, supra
note 24, at 458 ("It is difficult to imagine a more unsympathetic case for requiring
accommodation than that presented in Davis.").
" Justice Powell delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. See Davis, 442
U.S. at 399.
9' Id. at 409-11; see infra note 111 and accompanying text.
92 See Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.
" Marshall would later attempt to undo some of the harm in his unanimous
opinion in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1986). See infra Section I.C.l.b.
Here, however, he did nothing. Brennan, joined by Marshall and all of his brethren, would compound Stevens' error in Arline. See infra Section I.C.2.
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1343
(E.D.N.C. 1976), affd in part and vacated in part, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
95 Id.
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As a result, the court found that Ms. Davis would be unable to
receive a license as a Registered Nurse upon graduation."
The court explained that the evidence demonstrated that "it
would be difficult and, in fact, dangerous for plaintiff to even
attempt the clinical portion of the training program."97 Ac-

cordingly, the court found Southeastern's decision to reject Ms.
Davis both "reasonable and logical."98 Notably, the issue of
cost played no part in the decision.
Relying upon the newly-promulgated HEW regulations,
the Fourth Circuit reversed,9 9 explaining that the district
court erred "by considering the nature of the plaintiffs handicap in order to determine whether or not she was 'otherwise
qualified' for admittance to the nursing program, rather than
by focusing upon her academic and technical qualifications as
required by the newly promulgated [HEW] regulations."' 0
Rejecting the district court's "all or nothing" ruling, the court
held that if plaintiff met the academic and technical qualifications for admission, she should not be rejected "simply because
she may not be able to function effectively in all the roles
which registered nurses may choose for their careers."'
Remanding the case to the district court, the Fourth Circuit instructed the lower court to "give close attention" to the
plaintiffs claim that, under the HEW regulations, Southeastern should be required to modify its program to accommodate
her disability."2 Once again, cost played no part in the decision. Expressing approval for plaintiffs claim for modifications,
however, the court noted (in dictum) that "precedent... sup-

at 1344.
" Id.
9 Id. at 1345. The court noted that plaintiff elicited an admission on crossexamination that, "with special training and individual supervision, she could perform adequately in some selected fields of nursing." Id. at 1346. Because the court
found that Ms. Davis could not safely perform in both the training program and
in her profession, however, the court concluded that she was not "otherwise qualified" for admission. Davis, 424 F. Supp. at 1345.
98 Id.
"' See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The HEW regulations were promulgated approximately six months after the district court's decision. See id. at 1161.
'® Id. at 1161.
'o Id. at 1161 n.6
'¢ Id. at 1162. The court labeled this a claim for "affirmative relief." Davis, 574
F.2d at 1162.
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ports the requirement of affirmative conduct on the part of
certain entities under Section 504, even when such modifications become expensive.""°3 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's subsequent dictum on the issue of cost was quite to the
was, by contrast, without the support of any
contrary, and
114
precedent.
Setting forth the facts for a unanimous Court, Justice
Powell fully credited, and emphasized, the testimony of
Southeastern's expert, Mary McRee, that "respondents hearing
05
disability made it unsafe for her to practice as a nurse.""
Critically, Justice Powell also echoed the expert's assertion
that "it would be impossible for respondent to participate safely
in the normal clinical training program, and those modifica-

(emphasis added) (citing United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d
413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977)); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277,
1281-84 (7th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C.
1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. W. Va. 1976)). The two
circuit court cases cited by the court relied upon the new HEW regulations to find
an "affirmative duty" to make urban transit equipment accessible to plaintiffs,
implicitly, but not explicitly, addressing the issue of cost. See United Handicapped,
558 F.2d at 415-16; Lloyd, 548 F.2d at 1280-88. The district court cases, by contrast, explicitly rejected the defense of undue financial burden based solely upon
the broad language of Section 504. See Barnes, 436 F. Supp. at 639 (sympathizing
with defendant's fear that it would be forced to "shoulder a substantial financial
burden" but rejecting this defense because "there has been no challenge to [section
504's] validity and this court is bound by law to give it effect."); Hairston, 423 F.
Supp. at 184 ("School officials must make every effort to include such children
within the regular public classroom situation, even at great expense to the school
system.") (emphasis added).
104 See infra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 401 (1979) (empha'
sis added); see also id. at 401 n.1 ("McRee also wrote that respondents hearing
disability could preclude her practicing safely in 'any setting' allowed by 'a license
as L[icensed] Piracticall N[ursel.'"). Powell carefully notes that, upon Ms. Davis'
request for reconsideration, the entire nursing staff of Southeastern voted to deny
Ms. Davis admission after "McRee repeated her conclusion that on the basis of the
available evidence, respondent 'has hearing limitations which could interfere with
her safely caring for patients.'" Id. at 402 (emphasis added). Finally, Powell quotes
the district court's finding that "'[Respondent's] handicap actually prevents her
from safely performing in both her training program and her proposed profession
Of particularconcern to the court in this case is the potential of danger to
....
future patients in such situations.'" Id. at 403 (quoting Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976)) (emphasis added). As
the Third Circuit has explained: "Southeastern'sholding was particularly stringent
because the admission standards were designed to protect public health and safety,
a concern that has been given considerable deference by the courts." Nathanson v.
Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1384 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
103 Id.
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tions that would be necessary to enable safe participation
would prevent her from realizing the benefits of the proA finding of discrimination under such circumgram..
stances would be difficult indeed.
After delivering this loaded presentation of the facts, the
Court noted that "on the present record it appears unlikely
respondent could benefit from any affirmative action that the
" 10 7
regulation reasonably could be interpreted as requiring.
The HEW regulations, the Court explained, explicitly exclude
"devices or services of a personal nature" from the kinds of
auxiliary aids a school is required to provide to disabled individuals.' 8 "Yet the only evidence in the record indicates that
nothing less than close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would be sufficient to ensure patient safety if respondent took part in the clinical phase of the nursing program." "' Thus, the "curricular changes" and "individualized
attention" that Ms. Davis required, the Court concluded, would
constitute a "fundamental alteration" in the nature of
defendant's program that "is far more than the 'modification'
the regulation requires. " "O

106
107

Davis, 442 U.S. at 401-02 (emphasis added).
Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
Id.

109 Id.
i"o

Id. at 409-10.
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If one weeds through the dictum and the puzzling discussion of the concept of affirmative action,' the Court's narrow

holding is clear:
It is undisputed that respondent could not participate in
Southeastern's nursing program unless the standards were substantially lowered. Section 504 imposes no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of
standards to accommodate a handicapped person."'

The Court, characterizing plaintiffs claim under the HEW regulations as a
...
demand for "affirmative action," observed that "neither the language, purpose, nor
history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all
recipients of federal funds." Davis, 442 U.S. at 411. The Court's discussion of the
concept of affirmative action in conjunction with the requirement to make "reasonable accommodations" has been widely criticized. As one commentator observes:
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis of "accommodation" is confused and
contradictory. The Court found that there was no duty of affirmative
action in section 504. But affirmative action refers to a remedy for systemic discrimination, and involves a policy of active recruitment of members of a victimized group. Accommodation, on the other hand, refers to
the modification of programs, facilities, or operations to allow disabled
people to gain access ....

By confusing these two concepts, the Court

unfortunately created the impression that the duty of accommodation is
limited.
Rennert, supra note 10, at 380 (1988); see also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d
644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[Tlhe very use of the phrase 'affirmative action' in this
context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about any kind of affirmative
efforts without importing the special legal and social connotations of that term.");
Murphy, supra note 16, at 1623 ("By mistakenly equating accommodation with
affirmative action, the Court seemed to endorse the 'equal treatment' model of
discrimination."); Weber, supra note 45, at 1113 ("The casual use of the loaded
term 'affirmative action' for some modifications of program requirements suggested
that courts would require few modifications of any kind."); Wegner, supra note 24,
at 457 ("[The Davis Court] failed to recognize that 'affirmative action' is a term of
art, referring to special steps that may be required to recruit victims of previous
discrimination as participants in programs offering employment and educational
opportunities. Because section 504 was intended to apply in a broader range of
circumstances, it is not surprising that no such reference was included."). The Supreme Court moved decidedly away from this analysis in Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985). See also Rennert, supra note 10, at 386 ("Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, acknowledged the Davis Court's mistaken use of the
term 'affirmative action' in discussing the accommodations required by section
504."); infra Section I.C.l.b.
' Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979); see
Olenick, supra note 65, at 191 ("Despite the Court's broad pronouncements, the
case can be limited to relatively narrow grounds and the unusual factual record
presented to the Court."); Wegner, supra note 24, at 456 (noting that Court's holding was "rather narrow").
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Indeed, in its concluding sentence, the Court reiterated that
there was no "showing in this case that any action short of a
substantial change in Southeastern's program would render
1 13
unreasonable the qualifications imposed."
Essentially, the Court found that short of fundamentally
altering the standards of Southeastern's nursing program-standards adopted to ensure the safety of the public" 4-nothing could be done to accommodate plaintiffs dis5
ability; hence, there was no violation of the Act." Because
the Court found that no reasonable modifications could be
made to accomodate Ms. Davis, it had no reason to address the
question of how much such modifications might cost, or whether such costs could be deemed "reasonable" under the statute." 6 Such analysis would have required, at a minimum, an
examination of the Act and its legislative history, a careful
interpretation of the regulations governing postsecondary education, and a principled resolution of the difficult question
whether and under what circumstances cost can constitute a
7
valid defense to charges of discrimination." The Court
avoided such analysis entirely.
Unfortunately, however, Justice Stevens did mention cost
in discussing hypothetical situations in which a refusal to
Davis, 442 U.S. at 414.
See id. at 413 n.12 ("Southeastern's program . . . seeks to ensure that no
graduate will pose a danger to the public .... [Niothing in the Act requires an
educational institution to lower its standards.").
115 See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (1985) ("We held that the college was not
required to admit Davis because it appeared unlikely that she could benefit from
any modifications that the relevant HEW regulations required, and because the
would have compromised the essential
further modifications Davis sought ...
nature of the college's nursing program.") (citations omitted); Dopico, 655 F.2d at
652 ("In Davis a ruling in the plaintiffs favor would have required a change in
the nature of the program, a reconstruction of the college's entire professional
training process; in effect, it would have changed the accepted meaning of saying
that a person had undergone training as a registered nurse.") (emphasis omitted);
Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 443 ("The Court concluded that there were no modifications that the college could reasonably make in its program to enable Ms. Davis
to participate successfully in the program."); Olenick, supra note 65, at 185 ("Nothing in the record before the Supreme Court indicates that there were any modifications consistent with section 504 that could have enabled Davis to perform safely and effectively in the nursing program.").
16 See Weber, supra note 45, at 1113 ("The school was not asked to demonstrate the real costs of modifying its program or allowing the student to substitute
other forms of training experience.").
117 See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
113
114
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accommodate might constitute discrimination under the Act.
The relevant passage must be quoted at length in order for the
reader to understand the casual, theoretical, and gratuitous
context in which the fateful words were set forth:'
It is possible to envision situations where an'insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate
in a covered program. Technological advances can be expected to
enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise
to qualify them for some useful employment. Such advances also
may enable attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a state. Thus, situations
may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might
become unreasonable and discriminatory." 9

To characterize the Court's reference to "undue financial
and administrative burdens" as dictum is to give the statement
too much credit. 2 ° The issue of financial burdens formed no
part of the Court's holding and was certainly not essential to
its decision. 2' Furthermore, the Court did not even begin to

.. See Hauben, supra note 10, at 174 ("Since the Court spoke in such ambiguous and equivocal terms, the implications of the Davis decision are unclear.");
Rebell, supra note 70, at 1467 (noting the "highly restrictive qualifying phrases
contained in [this] passage").
119 Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis added).
1

0 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990) ("Statements and comments

in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily
involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and
lack the force of an adjudication."). The Court's reference to "burdens" was not
merely "not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in
hand," id., but was wholly without support or analysis. See infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text. Indeed, Justice Stevens' comment does not even appear to
reflect a "rule of law or legal proposition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 454. Rather, as Cook has observed: "This statement may have been only an observation by
the Court, intended simply as discourse .... [TIhe passage can fairly be read as
simple digression, a reassuring statement for grantees perhaps, that technological
advances eventually may make it less burdensome for them to comply with section
504." Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1513. If a category of judicial commentary less
forceful or binding than obiter dictum were to be established, this passage of Justice Stevens would serve as a fine example.
..
1 See Dopico, 687 F.2d at 652 ("The central issue in Davis, to which questions
of expenditures and effort were secondary, was whether 'an educational institution
[is required] to lower or to effect substantial modifications of [its] standards to
accommodate a handicapped person.'") (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 413) (alteration in
original); Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1513 ("The discussion of 'burdens' was not necessary to the decision in the case, and thus was pure obiter dictum."); Rennert,
supra note 10, at 391 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court did not reach this issue until it had
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undertake an analysis of the concept of cost in the context of
what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation." As we might
expect of such a casual dictum, the Court cites no case law or
authority for its use of the phrase "undue financial and administrative burdens," which, as noted, does not appear in the Act
22
or in the relevant sections of the HEW regulations.'
There was simply no reason for Justice Stevens to examine
the issue of cost" and potentially to do battle with an otherwise unanimous Court." Indeed, Justice Stevens mentions
neither section 504 nor the HEW regulations in this passage.
Had the Court undertaken the appropriate analysis, of course,
it would have discovered that neither the plain language of the
statute, nor its legislative history, nor the implementing regu-

already decided that only fundamental alterations in the college's nursing program
would allow Davis to participate, and that such accommodations were not mandated by section 504."); Wegner, supra note 24, at 458 ("Although the Court mentioned the financial and administrative burdens that may arise in accommodation
cases, it is clear that [other factors], not cost, were the principal bases for its decision."); Pamela Huessy Simon, Comment, Employment Discrimination- Analyzing
Handicap Discrimination Claims: The Right Tools for the Job, 62 N.C. L. REV.
535, 555 (1984) ("Under the Court's analysis, however, the accommodation issue
was never addressed squarely and the sub-issue of expense never emerged at all.")
(emphasis added).
" Compare this dictum with that of the Fourth Circuit, which did cite precedent for precluding cost as a defense to plaintiffs claim. See supra notes 103-104
and accompanying text.
"nSee Olenick, supra note 65, at 184 ("ITihe Court's broader pronouncements
on the requirements of section 504 were unnecessary to a resolution of the case
and inconsistent with the expressed intentions of Congress.").
124 Stevens' decision is replete with confusing and unsupported language. In
addition to his discussion of "affirmative action" and his reference to "undue financial and administrative burdens," Stevens raises the issue of discriminatory animus. Specifically, Stevens comments that Southeastern's desire to train persons to
perform all customary nursing functions, "far from reflecting any animus against
handicapped individuals, is shared by many if not most of the institutions that
train persons to render professional service." Davis, 442 U.S. at 413; see Rebell,
supra note 70, at 1466 ('[Alssuming sub silentio that intentional discrimination
was a relevant factor, the Court emphasized that Southeastern's program and its
admission requirements were established for the 'benign purpose' of training persons in professional nursing techniques."). A showing of animus is not, however,
necessary to proving a claim under the Act. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 296-297 (1985) ("[Mjuch of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the
Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.");
Rennert, supra note 10, at 368 ("Congress specifically intended the language of the
statute to be broad enough to encompass both intentional discrimination and unintentional discrimination.").
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lations supports a defense of undue financial burden in the
context of postsecondary education."
As we shall see, however, by isolating these words and
removing them from their context, both advocates and the
courts-including, momentously, the Supreme Court-have erroneously endowed them with the power of binding precedent. 2 ' Thus, Justice Stevens' dictum has been transformed
into the seminal holding that, in order to be reasonable, an
accommodation for disability must not impose undue financial
or administrative burdens.127 Notably, the chief culprit in this
transformation was the Supreme Court itself.12
a. The 1984 DOJ Regulations
In 1984, four years after Davis, the DOJ promulgated
implementing regulations'29 pursuant to the 1978 amendments to section 504,13 which extended section 504's man-

date to prohibit discrimination against the disabled in programs or activities conducted by executive agencies or by the
U.S. Postal Service.' 3 ' As a result, the DOJ regulations apply
to all programs or activities conducted by the DOJ. 12 What is
noteworthy about the 1984 regulations is that, for the first
time, they expressly allow a defense of "undue financial and

See supra Sections I.A. and I.B.

12

12 See infra Section I.C.2. and Part III.
127 One commentator, discussing Davis

in the context of public transportation
cases decided under the Act, similarly observes:
In Davis, the Supreme Court only mentioned the possible costs of accommodation in dicta .... The central issue in Davis was whether section

504 mandated a fundamental alteration in a nursing program to allow a
deaf woman to participate. Expenditures and reasonable accommodation
were secondary issues that the Supreme Court did not need to decide
once it found that only fundamental changes in the nursing program-not
reasonable accommodations-would allow Davis to participate.
Rennert, supra note 10, at 392. The author notes that courts have given significant weight to this dicta in applying Davis to the issue of accessible mass transit,
"thereby imputing to Davis a holding that is not there-that cost is a limitation on
the duty to accommodate." Id. See generally Id. at 391-98. As we shall see, this
phenomenon is by no means limited to mass transit. See infra Parts III and IV.
1

See discussion infra Section I.C.2.

.2 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 39.101-39.170 (1998).
...Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978); see supra note 78.
See 28 C.F.R. § 39.101.
132See Id. § 39.102.
1.1

BAD DECISIONS MAKE BAD DECISIONS

1999]

administrative burdens" in two specific areas: 'Program accessibility: Existing facilities"13 and "Communications."'34 In
both cases, the regulations provide that "where agency personnel believe that the proposed action would fundamentally
alter the program or activity or would result in undue financial
and administrative burdens," the agency, upon proving that
compliance would result in such fundamental alterations or
undue burdens, will not be required to take the requested
action.135 At the outset, it should be noted that this defense of
undue burdens is limited to cases involving access to existing
facilities and to communications. The regulations governing
other areas, including the general prohibitions against discrimination, do not allow for the defense. 3
The undue burdens language, which HEW clearly eschewed in its regulations,3 7 was taken verbatim from the
Davis decision.'38 In fact, in its "Section-by-Section Analysis
and Response to Comments," 39 the DOJ explained at length
that this language was based upon, and indeed, compelled by
the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, and by subsequent
lower court decisions. 40 The DOJ asserted:
The "undue financial and administrative burdens" language... is
based on the Supreme Court's Davis holding that section 504 does
not require program modifications that result in a fundamental
alteration in the nature of a program, and on the Court's statement
that section 504 does not require modifications that would result in
"undue financial and administrative burdens."""

As we have seen, however, the notion that the Supreme Court
in Davis established a defense based upon undue burdens is

'"
134

Id. § 39.150(a)(2).

Id. § 39.160(d).
§§ 39.150(a)(2), 39.160(d).
"' See 28 C.F.R. §§ 39.130, 39.140, 39.151 (1998). Cook's
1984 regulations "absolved federal agencies from the obligation
which they deem too burdensome," Cook(I), supra note 9, at
stated.
'"See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
'3' See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
supra note 119 and accompanying text.
15 Id.

'3'

assertion that the
to take 'any action'
1512, is thus over397, 412-13 (1979);

28 C.F.R. pt. 39, at 647-56 (1998).

See id. at 657 (judicial interpretation of section 504 in Davis and its progeny
"compels [the DOJI to incorporate the new language in the federally conducted
regulation").
. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
'o
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simply wrong.'4 2 This is apparent from the very language
that the DOJ employs: the Court's "holding" was that fundamental alterations would not be required; the Court made a
"statement" with regard to undue burdens.'
The Davis
Court did not, moreover, state that "section 504 does not require modifications that would result in 'undue financial and
did not
administrative burdens.""" As noted, Justice Stevens
145
even mention section 504 in the relevant passage.
The DOJ's error did not go unnoticed. Section 39.150 of
the regulations provoked the largest number of comments
received by the DOJ on any single issue. 46 Most of the commentators "sought the deletion of the 'undue financial and
administrative burdens' language from the regulation." 147 As
the DOJ noted:
Many commentators argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Davis did not require inclusion of an undue burdens defense in this
regulation. These commentators asserted that the holding in Davis
was that plaintiff was not a qualified handicapped person and that
the subsequent reference to "undue financial and administrative
burdens" was mere dicta.'

These commentators also pointed out, inter alia, that the DOJ
"had not included these provisions when, subsequent to the
Davis decision, it issued a regulation implementing section 504
in programs receiving Federal financial assistance from this
Department." 49
The DOJ responded by arguing that inclusion of the undue
burdens language was justified and even compelled by the
decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Ameri-

142
"
144

5
14'
17

See supra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. pt. 39, at 664.

Id.
See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. pt. 39, at 663-64.
Id. at 664.

14 Id.

149 Id. at 657. This is a reference to the 1980 DOJ regulations, 28 C.F.R.
§§ 42.501-42.540 (1998), which the DOJ promulgated to apply to "each recipient of
Federal financial assistance from the Department of Justice and to each program
receiving or benefitting from such assistance." Id. § 42.502. These regulations
largely mirror the HEW regulations and thus provide for a defense based upon
"undue hardship," with its concomitant consideration of cost, only in the area of
employment. Id. § 42.511(c). Like the HEW regulations, these regulations do not
even mention "undue financial burdens."
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can Public Transit Association v. Lewis ("APTA")5 ° and two
other circuit court decisions interpreting Davis. 5 ' The DOJ's
reliance upon APTA and its progeny was, however, misplaced.
First, APTA, like the two other cases cited by the DOJ, was a
mass transportation case.152 The DOJ provided no analysis or
support for its use of this precedent to create limitations in the
other areas governed by section 504.153
Second, and more importantly, APTA cannot be used to
support the DOJ's position, since it, too, erroneously relied on
the Davis dictum to support the establishment of an undue
burden defense. 54 In APTA, the D.C. Circuit argued that the
changes that plaintiffs sought "are the kind of burdensome
modifications that the Davis Court held to be beyond the scope
of section 504."15 Yet, even the DOJ admitted that the Davis
Court did not "hold" this.'56 As one leading commentator observed, the D.C. Circuit merely "compounded the Supreme
Court's mistakes." 5 ' The other cases cited by the DOJ are
similarly unavailing. 5 '
In short, the 1984 DOJ regulations provide no support for
the establishment of a defense based upon undue burden. As
we have seen, the regulations were the result of a misplaced
reliance upon Davis and its progeny.'59 The regulations,
0 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
...See Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); Rhode Island Handicapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490 (1st Cir.
1983).
1.. See Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1519 ("The Lewis decision invalidated only the
mass transit provisions of a Department of Transportation regulation requiring
accessible mass transit systems.").
1" As Cook points out, moreover, where, as here, a rulemaker changes its policy, "tt]he rulemaker is required to give sound reasons for the change." Cook(I),
supra note 9, at 1522. The DOJ made no attempt, other than its perfunctory and
misplaced reliance on Davis and APTA, to justify its decision. See Cook(I), supra
note 9, at 1523.
5' For an exhaustive critique of the decision in APTA, see Rennert, supra note
10. For an additional critique of the 1984 DOJ regulations, see Cook(I), supra note
9, at 1512-15.
'= APTA, 655 F.2d at 1278 (emphasis added).
= See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
x Rennert, supra note 10, at 377; see also Rennert, supra note 10, at 402
("[Tlhe Lewis court, relying on the dicta in Davis, inappropriately viewed the cost
of compliance with the former DOT regulations as a fundamental alteration.").
...See Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); Rhode Island Handicapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490 (1st Cir.
1983).
159 Moreover, in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Supreme Court
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which are expressly limited to progams or activities conducted
6 are contrary not only to the plain language of
by the DOJ,"'
the statute but also to Congressional intent and the HEW
regulations."' Furthermore, they contradict numerous other
agency regulations, including regulations drafted, like those of
the DOJ, after the APTA decision. 162 Finally, the DOJ regulations establish an undue burdens defense solely with regard to
existing facilities and communications.6 3
The Reagan Justice Department doubtless had ideological
reasons for "misreading" the Davis decision.1 "4 Ideology, however, cannot explain the repetition of this error by Justice
Brennan and numerous other courts and advocates, which
continues to this day.
b. Alexander v. Choate
It was not until Alexander v. Choate,65 six years after
Davis, that the Supreme Court again sought to clarify the
meaning of section 504. In Alexander, a group of disabled state
Medicaid recipients challenged Tennessee's proposal to reduce
the number of inpatient days for which the state would reimburse hospitals on behalf of Medicaid patients on a yearly
basis. The plaintiffs alleged that, although the proposal was
neutral on its face, it would disproportionately affect people
with disabilities in violation of the Act.
Although the Court ruled against the plaintiffs, Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, clearly sought to
distance the Court from the narrow language of Davis. Justice

cast considerable doubt upon the D.C. Circuit's analysis. The Tenth Circuit based
its decision largely upon the Supreme Court's holding in Davis that "section 504
does not give federal agencies the power to impose such onerous affirmative burdens on local programs." APTA, 655 F.2d at 1277. In Alexander, however, the
Supreme Court moved away from this holding, establishing that grantees must
make reasonable accommodations to avoid discrimination. See Alexander, 469 U.S.
at 301; infra Section I.C.1.b.
160 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
...See supra Sections I.A. and I.B.
162 See Wegner, supra note 24, at 417 n.42.
" See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
16 See Rennert, supra note 10, at 411-12 n.384. Rennert points out that "[tlhe
Reagan administration opposed the full accessibility requirement of the 1979 DOT
regulations" and "attempt[ed] to weaken § 504." Id. at 411.
1- 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

BAD DECISIONS MAKE BAD DECISIONS

1999]

Marshall acknowledged the strong criticism provoked by Jus66
tice Stevens' use of the term "affirmative action,"' and he
made clear that, under section 504, "an otherwise qualified
handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful
[TIo assure
access to the benefit that the grantee offers ....
meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's
program or benefit may have to be made."'67 Hence, Marshall
indicated that some affirmative steps would be required under
section 504. And "while a grantee need not be required to
make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommohandicapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable'
date the
"168
ones.
Once again, financial cost played no part in the Court's
decision. The Court did, however, erroneously suggest (in dictum) that, under Davis, some degree of administrative burden
would not be required under the Act. Responding to what it
characterized as an argument that recipients should be compelled to evaluate the effect on the disabled of every proposed
action that might affect their interests, the Court observed:
"The formalization and policing of this process could lead to a
69
wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudicative burden."'
"It should be obvious," the Court added, "that [the] administrative costs of implementing such a regime would be well
the accommodations that are required under Dabeyond
17
vis.
0
The Court's allusion to "administrative costs" should not
be confused with financial burden: the Court was not faced
with, and did not address, a claim involving undue financial
7
' In establishing the duty to make "reasonable acburden.1
"' Id. at 300 n.20 ("Our use of the term 'affirmative action' in this context has

been severely criticized for failing to appreciate the difference between affirmative

action and reasonable accommodation . . . ."); see Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 431

n.96 ("IT]he Court issued a retraction of its analytic confusion in Davis."); supra
note 111.
" Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301; see also id. at 301 n.21 ("The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent with the view that reasonable adjustments in the
nature of the benefit offered must at times be made to assure meaningful access.")
(citations omitted).
Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
'
16

Id. at 298.

Id. at 308. Once again, the Court provides no analysis or precedent to support this suggestion.
"' See Epstein, supra note 17, at 434 ("Although Davis, Alexander, and Arline
'7
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commodations," the Court did not recognize a defense based
upon financial burden. Rather, the Court held that a grantee
need not make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications,
i.e., accommodations that would "compromise[] the essential
nature of the.., program," or effect a "fundamental alteration
in the nature of a program."1 2 Thus, although the Court
ruled in favor of defendant, it nevertheless signaled a desire to
broaden-or, more accurately, to restore-the ample protection
afforded under section 504. Alexander thus constituted a clear
departure from the restrictive approach of Davis.'73
2. School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline
Eight years after Davis and two years after Alexander, the
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of "reasonable accommodations" under the Act in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline.'74 As in Davis, the Court mentioned "undue financial burden" in dictum, this time in a footnote. 7 '
Unfortunately, however, rather than correcting the confusion
created by the Davis dictum, Justice Brennan's decision merely
compounded the error.
In Arline, the Court examined the claim of Gene Arline, an
elementary school teacher discharged from her job after suffering a third relapse of tuberculosis in a two-year period. 7 ' The
case raised two basic questions: whether a person with tuberculosis was a "handicapped individual" under the Act and, if
so, whether she was "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary

brushed across issues germane to undue hardship, none of those cases involved a
claim that accommodating a person with a disability would have been too costly.
Those cases addressed administrative burdens, not financial burdens.") (emphasis
omitted).
172 Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted);
see Weber, supra note 45, at 1114 ("[The Court] clarified Davis' distinction between
reasonable accommodation and affirmative action, saying that Davis meant to
exclude from the requirements of section 504 only fundamental alterations in programs.").
173 See Rebell, supra note 70, at 1464 ("The contrasts between these two unanimous decisions of the Court ... are striking . .

. .");

Weber, supra note 45, at

1117 ("[Clourts have widely recognized that Choate expanded the reach of the law,
contrary to the suggestions given in Davis.").
174 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
175 Id.

at 288 n.17.
176See id. at 276.
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school. Answering the first question in the affirmative, the
Court next addressed the question of whether Ms. Arline was
"otherwise qualified." "The basic factors to be considered in
conducting this inquiry," the Court explained, "are well established."'7 7
In a corresponding footnote, the Court explained that
when a disabled individual is unable to perform the essential
functions of a job, a court must consider whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable the disabled
v
person to perform those functions.' Remarkably, citing Davis, the Court then explained the "well established" factors to
be considered in making this determination: "Accommodation
is not reasonable if it either imposes 'undue financial and administrative burdens' on a grantee, [citing Davis], or requires
79
'a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program."
Thus, eight years after Davis, with no directly relevant
intervening Supreme Court decisions,' the Supreme Court
elevated Justice Stevens' unsupported, casual dictum to the
level of binding, "well established" precedent. Indeed, the
Court cited no authority other than Davis-neither case law nor
statute nor regulation-for the proposition that an accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes "undue financial or administrative burdens" on a grantee.' Arline is thus a textbook
example of the dangers of shoddy research and interpretation-of blindly relying upon a case for a proposition that the
case does not and cannot support. Of course, practicing litigators will note that this is commonplace in both state and federal case law. What is astonishing, however, is that the Supreme
Court could refer to the Davis Court's naked dicta as "well
established" without further analysis, and without anyone on
the Court catching the error. This is particularly noteworthy,
82
moreover, because Justice Brennan wrote the decision.
,7 Id. at 287.
by the De178 See id. at 288 n.17 (citing the relevant regulations promulgated
partment of Health and Human Services).
...Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.17 (citing, inter alia, 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1985)
and 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 315 (1985)).
" If anything, Choate signaled a willingness to acknowledge and correct the
mistakes made in Davis, and to distance the Court from Davis.
' Cook(I), supra note 9, at 1515 ("The 'undue financial and administrative
burdens' language of Davis was repeated, again in dictum and without any analysis of its origin, in a footnote in Arline.").
Thomas Jefferson,
182 Late in his life, Justice Brennan wrote, "[tlo paraphrase
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Justice Brennan was in no way constrained to elevate, or
even to mention, the Davis dictum. First, cost was not at issue
in Arline.183 Hence, Brennan could have avoided any discussion of financial burden. Second, Brennan, like the other Justices, should have been aware that cost is generally not a defense to a civil rights claim."' One would not have expected
Brennan-and Marshall-to derogate from this principle, and
thus to limit the protections afforded under section 504, based
upon Stevens' passing comment in Davis.'8 5 Indeed, in
Choate, the Court signaled its intention to move away from the
Davis decision.86 Unfortunately, however, the entire Supreme Court simply has not conducted the research and analysis necessary to determine and specify the propriety of cost as
a defense under section 504.
Despite its erroneous conclusion, Arline cemented the
Davis dicta regarding undue financial burdens into disability
case law. Although the Arline decision should be limited to the
"employment context" in which it was decided, 8 ' neither Davis nor Arline drew any distinctions among the various contexts in which Rehabilitation Act claims might be brought,
which include employment; program accessibility; preschool,
elementary, and secondary education; postsecondary education;

eternal vigilance is the price of liberty and dignity-two of the true measures of
freedom." William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in REASON AND PASSION
17, 21 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz et al. eds., 1997). Normally the most vigilant of
justices, Justice Brennan was, frankly, asleep at the helm on this issue.
18 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
'
See, e.g., COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 126 ("Civil rights protections generally are not limited by cost considerations."); Cook(II), supra note 9, at 463 ("The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that the expenditures required to
remedy discriminatory conduct cannot abrogate the duty to do so."); Rennert, supra
note 10, at 391 ("In general, cost is not an excuse for not correcting a situation
which violates civil rights, and section 504 is not an exception to the general
rule."); Wegner, supra note 24, at 448 ("In interpreting antidiscrimination statutes
designed to provide increased protection to members of traditionally disadvantaged
classes, the courts have limited costs as a ground for denying equal opportunity.");
infra note 211 and accompanying text.
18 Justice Brennan's dictum thus also deviated from the established principle of
statutory construction that civil rights legislation is to be construed broadly to
effectuate its remedial purpose. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
1.. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
" Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. As we have seen, the HEW regulations did provide
for a consideration of "undue hardship" solely in the employment context. See
supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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and health, welfare, and social services.'88 Quite simply, neither court questioned whether Congress intended for the defense of undue cost to be available to defendants in any, let
alone all, types of claims. 8 9 Instead, Arline's sweeping citation of Davis left the impression that the "standard" articulated was to be applied universally, to cover all claims under the
Act. This would prove to be another fateful mistake. 9 '
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIS ACT

In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that, after 17
years, the Rehabilitation Act had failed to live up to its promise.' 9' The ambiguity of the statute, the paucity of legislative
history, and the confusing judicial interpretations that resulted
all combined to limit the effectiveness of section 504 of the Act.
"Partially because it recognized the problems caused by inconsistent interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act," the Third
coverage,
Circuit has observed, "and intending to broaden
92
Congress in 1990 enacted the Disabilities Act."

Congress expressly stated that the ADA was intended "to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.""9 3 The implication, of course, was that the Rehabilitation Act did not fulfill this function, and that the ADA was an
attempt to clarify Congress' intentions with regard to the dis-

'
g,

See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.

19 See infra Part III.

...Cook(II), supra note 9, at 416 ('In the ADA, Congress determined, as apparently did the Executive, that section 504 simply was not working as a means of
eradicating discrimination and segregation in this country."); Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 195 (1989) (statement of Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh) ("Fifteen years have gone by since the Rehabilitation
Act took effect. Nevertheless, persons with disabilities are still too often shut out
of the economic and social mainstream of American life."); Brandfield, supra note
11, at 114 ("Unfortunately, the Rehabilitation Act has not had as substantial an
effect on the lives of the handicapped as was hoped."); ADA COMPLIANcE GUIDE
1 110 (Thompson Publ'g Group, Inc. 1990 & Supp. Dec. 1992) ("Over time, however, it became evident that more comprehensive coverage than that afforded under the [Rehabilitation Act] would be needed for disabled people to enjoy truly
equal protection.").
"
McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1995).
' 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
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abled. In the ADA, then, Congress provided more explicit direction, expressly requiring the promulgation of implementing
regulations... and, as we shall see, providing guidance on the
content of those regulations.19 5 The ADA thus "constitutes a
second-generation civil rights statute that goes beyond the
'naked framework' of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and
refinement to traditional nondiscrimination law." 96
Similarly, Congress explicitly indicated that the ADA was
intended "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." 97 As one court observed:
It is important to keep in mind that lawmakers made clear that the
ADA was norm-changing legislation, akin to the legislative turning
points in this country's struggle to overcome racial discrimination.
President Bush referred to the Act as an "historic new civil rights
Act." Senator Tom Harkin, the champion of the Act, announced it to
be the "20th century EmancipationProclamationfor all persons with
disabilities," while Senator Dole called it "the most comprehensive
civil rights legislation our Nation has ever seen." Unlike other legislation designed to settle narrow issues of law, the ADA has a comprehensive reach and should be interpreted with this goal in
mind.

19

8

Consistent with these broad pronouncements, Congress

expressly indicated that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied
under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ...

or the regu-

lations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title."'9
194 In Title II of the ADA, Congress expressly required that the DOJ "promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement this part." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134(a) (1994).
"' See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 415.
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). Congress similarly stated that the ADA was
intended "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." Id.
§ 12101(b)(4). Accordingly, the ADA "must be broadly construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose." Lincoln Cerpac v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 920 F. Supp.
488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted); accord Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849
F. Supp. 1429, 1441 n.20 (D. Kan. 1994); see supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
19. Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 771 (E.D. Tex.
1996) (citations omitted).
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); accord ADA COMPLIANCE

BAD DECISIONS MAKE BAD DECISIONS

1999]

"This directive," the Supreme Court recently held, "requires us
to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as
by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation
provided
0
20

Act."

Hence, although the two statutes contain many similarities, the ADA is both more comprehensive and more specific."° ' The protections provided by the Act and by the various
implementing regulations provide a floor, but not a ceiling, by
which the ADA's protections are to be measured. As Cook explains:
Given Congress's understanding that public officials historically
have been among the major perpetrators of segregated services in
this country, and given the congressional findings, legislative history, and case law regarding the continued persistency and the stigmatic evils of segregation, Congress would not have simply reenacted without clarification the identical requirements it enacted seven2
teen years previously to little effect."

Unfortunately, however, "most cases involving either section 504 or title II will involve both statutes, inducing the
°3
courts to interpret them to achieve a uniform result." As a
consequence, despite Congress' rejection of Justice Stevens'
reasoning in Davis,20 4 and despite clear implementing regulations to the contrary,"5 courts continue erroneously to import
the undue burdens language into ADA claims in circumstances
6
under which Congress expressly precluded such a defense.
Congress was, of course, well aware of the Davis decision,
and of the conflicting HEW and DOJ regulations, at the time it
promulgated the ADA." 7 Indeed, in contrast with the Act,20
there is ample legislative history0 9 to indicate that in draft122 (Supp. Feb. 1992) ('The ADA does not reduce the
504.").
scope of coverage or apply a lesser standard than is required by section 25,
1998).
20 Bragdon v. Abbot, No. 97-156, 1998 WL 332958, at *6 (U.S. June
201 See, e.g., Brandfield, supra note 11, at 115 ("[The ADA is not an
amendment to the Rehabilitation Act, but rather a more comprehensive statute
that differs both in scope and effect.").
202 Cook(II), supra note 9, at 416.
203 Weber, supra note 45, at 1117.
204 See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Section II.B.
20 See infra Part III.
20 See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
2N See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
20 See Brandfield, supra note 11, at 126 ("Under the ADA, however, the courts
GUIDE, supra note 191, at
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ing the ADA, Congress specifically considered both the issue of
cost and the undue burdens defense.2 1 ° As Cook convincingly
demonstrates, that history reveals that "Congress determined
that the benefits of integration far outweighed the costs of
compliance with the ADA."2 1' This included not merely the
societal, moral costs of segregation, but the economic costs as
well.212 As Senator Edward Kennedy proclaimed:
Some will argue that it costs too much to implement this bill. But I
reply, it costs too much to go on without it. We are spending billions
of dollars today in the federal budget on programs that make disabled citizens dependent, not independent .... The short term cost
of this legislation is far less than the long-term gain.21 3

Indeed, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
"heard testimony and reviewed reports concluding that discrimination results in dependency on social welfare programs that cost the taxpayers unnecessary billions of dollars
each year. " " As one witness noted, "[the National Council

should more easily be able to interpret the language because it is much more
definite and has extensive legislative history.").
210 In fact, in introducing the ADA in 1988, Senator Lowell Weicker announced
that "the costs associated with this bill are a small price to pay for opening up
our society to persons with disabilities." 134 CONG. REC. S5109 (daily ed. Apr. 28,
1988).
211 Cook(II), supra note 9, at 464. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S4986 (daily ed.
May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("[Closts do not provide the basis for an
exemption from the basic principles in a civil rights statute, like the ADA. The
mandate to end discrimination must be clear and unequivocal."); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong. 184 (1989) (statement of Laura D. Cooper) ("I don't know any other civil rights statute that even
has any cost analysis or cost exemptions or cost justifications or cost anything in
it.").
212See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 101st Cong. 38 (1989) (statement of Rep. Martinez) ("It will
cost to build the necessary facilities to let people in. It will cost more to lock
them out. It will cost us morally. It will cost us money as well.").
213 135 CONG. REC. S4993 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy);
see 135 CONG. REC. S10,737 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("It
is going to impose a lot of expenses and rightly so. It is time that we did these
things. It is time that we brought persons with disabilities into full freedom, economic and otherwise, with other citizens in our society. This bill will do that. In
doing so we should be aware that it is going to be costly and it is going to be difficult and that there will be some complaints.").
214 Report of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, S. REP. No.
101-116, at 16 (1989); see, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,713 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)
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on Disability, 15 distinguished Reagan appointed Republicans. .. , studied the problems of people with disabilities for
more than three years. They concluded that the cost of discrimination far exceeds the cost of eliminating it." 215 Congress accordingly concluded that focusing on the costs of compliance by
covered entities was totally inappropriate given the economic
benefits to society of reducing the deficit by getting people off
21
of welfare, out of institutions, and onto the tax rolls.

(statement of Sen. Harkin) ("Thus, enactment of the ADA will save billions of
dollars per year that are currently being expended on social welfare programs.");
135 CONG. REC. S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("The
economic benefits to society in terms of reductions in the deficit from getting people off welfare, out of institutions, and on to the tax rolls cannot be ignored.");
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms.
on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education
and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess 39 (1989) (statement of Rep. Bartlett) ("[]f we
pass legislation like this that empowers people to be able to control their own
lives, there will be a cost savings to the Federal Government and that is true as
we give people the chance to be independent to provide for their own employment,
their own income, their own housing, their own transportation, that, in fact, would
save the taxpayers substantial sums from the alternatives."); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources
and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 78 (1989) (statement of Neil
F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois) ("There will be unquestionably major
public costs involved in coming into compliance with the Title III requirements for
new buses, new railcars, access to stations, and general program access. But there
are major public costs involved when society is not accessible for everyone. What
we might call that is a 'lost opportunity cost,' and we see it running in the hundreds of millions of dollars."); Statement of President George Bush, Remarks on
Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in
REAMS, supra note 1 ("And when you add together Federal, State, local, and private funds, it costs almost $200 billion annually to support Americans with disabilities-in effect, to keep them dependent."); see also Dick Thornburgh, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: What It Means to All Americans, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 375, 378 (1991) ("Any hardship cost created, however, may well be offset by
corresponding gains.").
21' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Select Education and Employment Opportunities, 101st Cong. 57
(1989) (statement of Mr. Dart); see 135 CONG. REc. H2440 (daily ed. May 17,
1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("Can the cost of any reasonable accommodation
compare to what we are paying to keep qualified people unemployed?").
216 See 135 CONG. REC.
S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Harkin); see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st
Cong. 78 (1989) (statement of Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois) ("Because equal opportunity is an American right and calls for a national policy, it
also calls for a commitment of Federal funds."); 135 CONG. REC. S4993 (daily ed.
May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Vast resources can be saved by making disabled Americans productive Americans.").
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Title II of the ADA reflects this sentiment, explicitly limiting the undue burdens defense to discrete circumstances. The
following discussion briefly examines Title II and the implementing regulations promulgated by the DOJ. As the discussion indicates, Congress left no doubt of its intention generally
to preclude the undue burdens defense in claims brought under
Title II.
A. Title II of the ADA
Similar to section 504 of the Act,217 Title II of the ADA
broadly provides: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter,
no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."21 The chief difference between the statutes is that section 504 applies to all entities that receive federal financial
assistance,2 19 whereas Title II covers "any State or local government" or "any department, agency, special purpose district,
instrumentality of a State or States or local governor other
220
ment.
Title II also provides greater insight into Congress' intent
than section 504, particularly with regard to the issue of cost.
Both the statute itself and ample legislative history demonstrate Congress' rejection of Justice Stevens' dictum in Davis
and a general aversion to the undue burdens defense
inadvertantly spawned by that dictum. As one commentator
explains:
In the legislative history of title II, the congressional committees
held out Choate as the definitive interpretation of section 504 that it

217 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 438 (1998) ("[The standards adopted in this
part are generally the same as those required under section 504 for federally
assisted programs."); Weber, supra note 45, at 1099 ("Title II's statutory language

restates section 504 in its general terms . .

").

42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999).
219 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985 and Supp. 1998).
220 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); see 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app.
A, at 437-38 (1998) ("Title II of the ADA extends th[e] prohibition of discrimination to include all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by
state and local governments or any of their instrumentalities or agencies, regardless of the receipt of Federal financial assistance.").
218
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intended title II to copy. Davis does not receive mention. Similarly, a
few other cases, all sympathetic to the claims of persons with disabilities, appear as examples of what Congress wanted title II to
accomplish. This "selective incorporation" of section 504 case law
gives a different cast to title II than that of section 504. Section 504
must live with all the baggage of its past. The congressional committees intended to give title II only some of that baggage, generally
that most favorable to persons with disabilities."

Indeed, Congress specifically concluded that defendants
generally should not be permitted to raise an undue burdens
defense under Title II. As the House Committee on the Judiciary observed:
While the integration of people with disabilities will sometimes involve substantial short-term burdens, both financial and administrative, the long-range effects of integration will benefit society as a
whole .... The specific sections on employment and program access
in existing facilities are subject to the "undue hardship" and "undue
burden" provisions of the regulations which are incorporated in
204. No other limitation should be implied in other arSection
2
eas. M

Unlike section 504, moreover, Congress expressly clarified its
intent in the statute itself.
Except for "program accessibility, existing facilities", and "communications", regulations under [Title III shall be consistent with this
chapter and with the coordination regulations ... promulgated by
[HEW] on January 13, 1978 .... With respect to "program accessibility, existing facilities", and "communications", such regulations
shall be consistent with regulations and analysis as in part 39 of
title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, applicable to federally
conducted activities under such section 794 of Title 29.223

Weber, supra note 45, at 1115-16; accord Cook(II), supra note 9, at 428
("Congress rejected Justice Powell's reasoning in the first Supreme Court case
concerning section 504, Southeastern Community College v. Davis."); see H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990) ("[I]t is . . . the Committee's intent that section
[12132] also be interpreted consistent with Alexander v. Choate."). See generally
Cook(II), supra note 9, at 428-29.
' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Report of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990) (emphasis added). The House
Judiciary Committee further noted: "The fact that it is more convenient, either
administratively or fiscally, to provide services in a segregated manner, does not
constitute a valid justification for separate or different services under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, or under this title." Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12134(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); see Cook(II), supra note
9, at 462 ("As a statutory compromise, Congress adopted the weaker standard
permitting waivers for undue burdens and fundamental alterations of programs,
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Rather than leave it to the courts, or to an administrative
agency, Congress instructed the DOJ to promulgate regulations consistent with the 1978 HEW regulations,224 with limited exception. As we shall see, the DOJ did precisely that.2"
Under Title II, then, there is no need to deconstruct Davis and
Arline: Congress' rejection of the undue burdens defense is
statutorily prescribed.
B. The Implementing Regulations
The DOJ regulations, which are entitled to legislative and
therefore controlling weight,226 expressly apply to "all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by
public entities."227 In four separate subparts, the regulations
establish general prohibitions against discrimination228 as

but only for those portions of the ADA rules governing 'program accessibility/existing facilities,' and 'communications,' (i.e. architectural and communications
barriers). Congress then specified that every other aspect of the public services
title was to be governed by the more stringent HEW regulation, which permitted
no waiver of obligations based upon cost.").
' See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Section II.B.
22 See, e.g., Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d
37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997); Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because Title II
was enacted with broad language and directed the Department to promulgate
regulations . . . , the regulations which the Department of Justice promulgated are
entitled to substantial deference."); supra note 68 and accompanying text. The
Third Circuit has suggested, moreover, that because Congress expressed its approval of the regulations promulgated under section 504 of the Act in enacting the
ADA, the DOJ regulations are entitled to even greater force:
The legislative history demonstrates that the congressional committees
drafting the Disabilities Act were conversant with regulations previously
adopted to implement section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Indeed, in
certain respects the committee reports borrowed language from some of
these regulations in explaining the meaning of the proposed Disabilities
Act . . . Consequently, the regulations so utilized have more than usual
force in providing guidance for interpretation of the Act.
McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Helen L., 46 F.3d
at 332-33 ("[Section 35.130(d) of the ADA regulations] is almost identical to the
section 504 integration regulation which has been in effect since 1981. As Congress has voiced its approval of that coordination regulation, Section 35.130(d) has
the force of law.").
228 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1998).
2 Id. §§ 35.130-135.
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well

as specific rules

governing employment,22 9 program

accessibility,"' and communications.2 3 ' Consistent with
Congress' intent, the regulations provide for a defense based
upon undue financial burden only in limited circumstances.
In the area of employment, the DOJ regulations incorporate "the requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, as established by the regulations of the Department of
Justice in 28 CFR part 41. " "2 Thus, public employers need
any accommodation that would cause "undue hardnot provide
n
ship.""233
The regulations governing program accessibility make a
clear distinction between "Existing facilities" and "New construction and alterations."23 4 With respect to existing facilities, the regulations do not require a public entity "to take any
action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental
alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in
undue financial and administrative burdens.""5 Instead, the

regulations require that "each service, program, or activity
conducted by a public entity, when viewed in its entirety, be
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.""6 In its section-by-section analysis, however, the DOJ
makes clear that "[tIhis paragraph does not establish an abso22

See id.

§ 35.140.

'o See id. §§ 35.149-151.
2", See id. §§ 35.160-64.
28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(2) (1998).

Id. § 41.53; see Weber, supra note 45, at 1102 ("In the area of employment,
section 504 and title II apply the same limit to the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation-the employer need not provide an accommodation that would
cause undue hardship.").
4 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149-151.
' Id. § 35.150(a)(3) (emphasis added). The DOJ explains that the concept of
"program accessibility" reflected in the regulations stems from the HEW regulations of 1977. Id. pt. 35, app. A, at 455. The "undue burdens" language set forth
in subsection 35.150(a)(3), however, is "taken from the section 504 regulations for
federally conducted programs." Id. The latter must refer to the 1984 DOJ regulations, since, it may be recalled, the HEW regulations, which predated the Davis
decision, eschewed any mention of "undue financial or administrative burdens." See
supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text; see also Weber, supra note 45, at 1103
("The title II regulations are somewhat more explicit than those of section 504,
however.").
" 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 455 ("[The program access requirement of title
II should enable individuals with disabilities to participate in and benefit from the
services, programs, or activities of public entities in all but the most unusual
cases."); see 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a).
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lute defense" and that compliance "would in most cases not
financial and administrative burdens on a
result in undue
237
entity."
public
By contrast, the regulations governing "New construction
and alterations" contain no such defense. Instead, the regulations broadly require that new facilities be "designed and constructed in such manner that the facility or part thereof of the
facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities,"23 and that facilities "be altered in such manner
that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities .... .""
Finally, the regulations governing communications provide
for a defense based upon "undue financial and administrative
burdens."24" The DOJ explains that, like section 35.150(a)(3),
this section "limits the obligation of the public entity to ensure
effective communication in accordance with Davis and the
circuit court opinions interpreting it."241 The establishment of
this defense is not, however, "in accordance with Davis," but
with section 12134(b) of Title 11.242 In any event, the DOJ
suggests that, like the regulations governing existing facilities,
compliance would in most cases not result in undue financial
and administrative burdens on a public entity.243

27 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 455. The regulations establish that "a public
entity has the burden of proving that compliance with § 35.150(a) of this part
would result in such alteration or burdens." 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a); see Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1074 (3d Cir.
1993) ("New construction and alterations, however, present an immediate opportunity to provide full accessibility."); AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2:110 (C. Angela Van Etten ed. 1994) ("[I]n contrast to the
regulations governing the accessibility of existing facilities, the regulations governing new construction and alterations are substantially more stringent and consequently the undue burden defense is not available in the context of alterations.");
Weber, supra note 45, at 1104 ("Undue burden operates only as a limit on covered
entities' obligations with respect to program accessibility as a whole and the operation of facilities already in existence. Under title II, undue burden does not excuse a failure to make altered or new facilities accessible."); supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b); see Kinney, 9 F.3d at 1071 ("This obligation of accessibility for alterations does not allow for non-compliance based upon undue burden.").
242 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (1998).
241 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 461.
242 See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
243 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 461 ("The preamble discussion of § 35.150(a)

regarding [the determination whether there is an undue financial or administrative
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Pursuant to Congress' explicit instructions, the DOJ regulations provide no other exception based upon undue burden.' As the Third Circuit explained in Kinney v. Yerusalim:
"There is no general undue burden defense in the ADA. Rather, following the Section 504 regulations for program access in
existing facilities, as Congress intended, the ADA regulations
45
provide for the defense only in limited circumstances."
To be more specific, all other claims brought under Title II
are governed by the standard set forth in section 35.130(b)(7)
of the regulations,2 46 which requires that entities make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when
the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the
basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate
alter the
that making the modifications would fundamentally
247
nature of the service, program, or activity."
Congress' intention to limit the undue burdens defense
could hardly be clearer. The following section reveals, however,
that, notwithstanding this bright line, courts and advocates
persist in misapplying this defense.2 48
burden] is applicable to this section."). The DOJ thus incorporated its discussion of
undue burdens with regard to section 35.150(a) into the discussion of section
35.164. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. The DOJ also stated that,
"N[because of the essential nature of the services provided by telephone emergency
systems, the Department assumes that § 35.164 will rarely be applied to § 35.162
[which governs telephone emergency services]." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 461.
24 See AMERICANs WITH DIsABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 2:110 (C. Angela Van Etten ed. 1994) ("There is no general undue burden defense in the ADA, but only regulations providing for the defense in limited circumstances, as for example in existing facilities and programs.").
24 Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1074 (3d Cir. 1993).
24 Section 35.130 "establish[es] the general principles for analyzing whether any
particular action of the public entity violates this [Title III mandate." 28 C.F.R. pt.
35, app. A, at 447.
24 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998) (emphasis added).
28 In its section-by-section analysis of section 35.130, the DOJ misleadingly
alludes to "undue burden," in the context of communications: "For example, it may
constitute an undue burden for a public accommodation, which provides a full-time
interpreter in its special guided tour for individuals with hearing impairments, to
hire an additional interpreter for those individuals who choose to attend the integrated program." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 448. This is misleading because, as
we have seen, communications represents one of the only areas in which the DOJ
regulations provide for a consideration of undue burden. See supra Section II.B.;
ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 191, at 850 ("Under the ADA, removing
communication barriers is an affirmative step that all state and local governments
must take, although their obligation is limited by the 'undue burden' standard.").
As Cook explains: "[Clommunications barriers are the singular statutory and regu-
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III. THE COMPOUNDING OF ERRORS: ERRONEOUS APPLICATION
OF THE UNDUE BURDENS DEFENSE

There are, unfortunately, numerous examples of improper
application of the undue burdens defense, right up to the present day, including the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead.249 This section briefly examines a small number of
representative circuit court cases decided prior to Olmstead. As
the analysis indicates, these cases have adopted the defense as
a result of a number of errors, including interpreting the disability statutes identically and simultaneously, failing to read
the relevant implementing regulations, citing the wrong regulations, citing the Davis and Arline dicta as binding precedent
(regardless of the factual basis of plaintiffs claim), and citing
earlier mischaracterizations of this dicta without analyzing the
original source.
In some of these cases, the undue burdens analysis has
been dispositive, in others, a contributing factor in defendant's
victory. Even in those cases where plaintiffs prevailed, however, the analysis has had at least two deleterious consequences:
it has resulted in an unnecessary waste of time and resources
for both the court and the parties, and it has created additional unfounded precedent, guaranteeing the further compounding
of errors.
This analysis begins with a trio of cases from the Third
Circuit, which allow us to trace the successive errors of a single court through the years. In Nathanson v. Medical College of
Pennsylvania,"0 the Third Circuit examined the section 504
claim of Jayne G. Nathanson, a medical school student with
disabilities, 5 ' who argued that the Medical College of Pennlatory exception to the general requirement that auxiliary aids and program modifications be provided without regard to financial and administrative burden. However, the Attorney General's discussion unfairly fails to mention this critical caveat." Cook(II), supra note 9, at 432 n.271. The DOJ certainly was not attempting,
through administrative fiat, to abrogate the express intention of Congress, see
supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text, or the DOJ's own regulations, which
provide for no undue burdens defense. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). But see Lucille
D. Wood, Costs and the Right to Community-Based Treatment, 16 YALE L. & POLY
REV. 501, 505 (1998) ("In this appendix the undue burden defense, and with it the
language of costs, creeps in the back door.").
...See discussion infra Part IV.
2" 926 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991).
2. Specifically, Ms. Nathanson suffered from "continuing back and neck injuries"
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sylvania ("MCP") had failed reasonably to accommodate her request for closer parking and a straight-back chair."s Focusing on the concept of "reasonable accommodation," the court
explained that "[t]he standard for reasonable accommodation
was first set forth in Southeastern Community College v. Davis."253 Citing Davis, the court announced that "a recipient's
refusal to modify a program may be unreasonable, and therenot entail an
fore a violation of § 504, if the modification would
4
burden."1
administrative
or
undue financial
This is, of course, a reference to the Davis dictum, which,
as we have seen, established no such thing. 5 In fact, in the
very same paragraph, the court acknowledged that the Davis
majority "found that the defendant nursing program's requirement for certain physical qualifications was legitimate because
to change it would fundamentally alter the curriculum.""5
Unfortunately, however, the court did not endeavor to distinguish between Davis' holding and its dictum.
In establishing the undue burdens defense, the Third Circuit relied not merely upon Davis, but also upon the implementing regulations promulgated by HEW. Rather than citing
the applicable regulations governing "Postsecondary Education,"" however, the Nathanson court cited the HEW regulations governing "Employment Practices."25 The court therefore concluded that a recipient must make reasonable accommodations "unless the recipient can show that the accommodation 'would impose undue hardship on the operation of its
program."'' 9 Again citing only the regulations governing em-

resulting from an automobile accident. Id. at 1370. Among other things, defendant
argued that it neither knew nor had reason to know that Ms. Nathanson was
disabled, and that Ms. Nathanson never specifically requested the accommodations
at issue in the lawsuit. See id. at 1382. The Third Circuit remanded the case,
inter alia, for determination of these disputed facts. See id. at 1386-87.
212

See id. at 1386.

"' Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1383 (citing Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).
21'Id. at 1383 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13).
215

See supra Section I.C.1.

...Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1383 (emphasis added).
257 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.41-84.47 (1998).
28 Id. §§ 84.11-84.14.
259 926 F.2d at 1385 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1990)). The court added: "We
find nothing inconsistent between the regulations and the Supreme Court holdings
[in Davis and Alexander] that we have reviewed." Id. By "regulations," the Third
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ployment practices, as well as Nelson v. Thornburgh,2" an
employment case, the court generically asserted that "the regulations" suggest the factors to be considered in determining
whether an accommodation would create an undue hardship,
including "[tihe nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 261
The court's reliance upon the employment regulations,
rather than the regulations governing postsecondary education,
was another serious error. As we have seen, the HEW regulations provide different standards for different factual contexts.
In particular, "[elducational institutions are not subject to a
reasonable accommodationlundue hardship standard, as are
employers."26 2 Failing to distinguish among the various regulations, the Nathanson court cited the wrong regulations to
establish a defense that does not exist in the context of higher
education, namely, that "[aiccommodations that are
'reasonable' must not unduly strain financial resources."263
Based upon this erroneous reasoning, the court remanded
the case, inter alia, for resolution of the "disputed issue of fact
whether Nathanson needed 'reasonable' accommodations that
would not cause 'undue financial or administrative burdens' or
'impose an undue hardship' upon the functioning of the
recipient's program."2" Aside from the fact that the court's
errors resulted in the establishment of a significant limitation
in the rights of the disabled, both the court and the parties
were forced to expend substantial time and money on an irrelevant issue. The court's remand on the issue of cost, moreover,
ensured that further time expense would be dedicated to this
judge-made defense.

Circuit must have been referring merely to the regulations governing employment
practices, rather than the appropriate regulations governing postsecondary education; by "holdings," the court must have been referring merely to dictum. See supra Sections I.B. and I.C.
2" 567 F. Supp. 369, 379-80 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
2.. Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1386.
21 Olenick, supra note 65, at 179; see supra notes 53-66 and accompanying

text.
213

926 F.2d at 1386.
at 1386 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Southeastern

214 Id.

Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 397; 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1990)). The
court's perfunctory reliance upon Alexander for this proposition is as puzzling as
its citation to Davis and the HEW employment regulations.
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265 the Third
Three years later, in Easley v. Snider,
Circuit again examined the issue of reasonable accommodation,266 this time under the ADA. In Easley, the plaintiffs
brought suit challenging the requirement under the Pennsylvania Attendant Care Act ("PACA") that individuals eligible for
26 7
attendant care be not only disabled but also mentally alert.
At trial, the plaintiffs provided expert testimony that consumers could and did employ surrogates to help manage attendant
caregivers, obviating the need for mental alertness.2 68 Plaintiffs therefore argued that, with reasonable modifications, they
were eligible for attendant services.
The defendant argued that "the right to exercise consumer
control" was an essential part of its program, and, since plaintiffs could not themselves exercise such control, they were not
otherwise qualified for the services under the ADA. 269 The
district court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding plaintiffs eligible
for attendant care because "the basic services would be the
same regardless of the consumer role"2 70 and noting that defendant "never rebutted why, in practical terms, the state
could not amend the act to allow this accommodation [of providing surrogates] to replace the need for the consumer to be
able to hire, fire and supervise. 27 '
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed on two grounds.
First, the Third Circuit found that plaintiffs sought a modification that would change "the essential nature of the program, 27 2 which was "to foster independence through consumer control for individuals who, but for their physical disabilities, could manage their own lives."273 Second, and more importantly for our analysis, the court ruled that the modification

2-

36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).

2" Under the relevant DOJ regulations, the precise term is "reasonable modifi-

cations." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998). Like many other courts, however, the
Third Circuit, in Easley, used the terms "reasonable modifications" and "reasonable
accommodations" interchangeably. See, e.g., 36 F.3d at 302.
2 See 36 F.3d at 298-99.
26 See Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 676 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 36
F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
211Id.

at 676.

Id.
271 Id. at 676 n.4 (citation omitted).
27236 F.3d at 304.
273 Id.
270
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that plaintiffs sought "would create an undue and perhaps
impossible burden on the State."2 74
Notably, the district court never examined the issue of
undue burden; rather, the district court correctly assessed
plaintiffs' claim under section 35.130(b)(7) of the DOJ regulations,275 which provides no defense based upon undue burden.276 The district court therefore properly concluded that, to
prevail, defendants must prove that the requested modification-the hiring of surrogates-would "'fundamentally alter' the
program."27 7 This, the district court found, defendant could
not do."7
Disregarding the governing regulations that the district
court properly cited, the Third Circuit proceeded to read an
undue burdens analysis into the district court decision:
The district court's statement ... can only be interpreted to mean
that unless removing the mental alertness criteria would be an
unreasonable accommodation, i.e., "would require either a modification of the essential nature of the program, or impose an undue
burden on the recipient of federal finds," the State would have to
drop the requirement."'

The Third Circuit posited that the district court must have
so concluded based upon the Third Circuit's erroneous conclusion that "[tihe test to determine reasonableness of a modification is whether it alters the essential nature of the program or
imposes an undue burden or hardship in light of the overall

Id. at 305.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
271 See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
2 841 F. Supp. at 676 n.4.
278 Id. ("I find that the use of surrogates would be a reasonable accommodation
to the Attendant Care Program, and that the experience of caregivers and consumers reveals that it would not 'fundamentally alter' the program.").
279 36 F.3d at 302. Here, the Third Circuit was quoting Strathie v. Department
of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983), a transportation case decided
under the Act seven years before the passage of the ADA, and eight years before
the promulgation of the DOJ regulations that should have governed the Easley
plaintiffs' ADA claim. Strathie erroneously derived its undue burdens language,
moreover, from the dictum in Davis and, as in Nathanson, from Nelson v.
Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 379-82 (E.D. Pa. 1983), an employment case. See
Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230 (Under Davis, "requiring accommodation is unreasonable
if it would place undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on the recipient of federal funds.") (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 412; Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 379-82); see also
supra notes 254-258.
274
275
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program.""' For this conclusion, the Third Circuit cited three
sources: (1) Justice Brennan's inaccurate and inapposite dictum set forth in a footnote in Arline,2"' an employment case;
(2) Alexander,8 2 which does not even mention undue burdens
on the page cited2" and certainly established no such
test;2" and (3) Nathanson,2 " the foibles of which we have
just reviewed.286
Easley thus perfectly illustrates the compounding of multiple errors to construct an analysis that Congress expressly
precluded. And indeed, Easley was in large measure based
upon the Third Circuit's determination that the modification
requested "would create an undue and perhaps impossible
burden on the State."2 7 Compare this outcome with the district court's decision, which correctly eschewed any examination of undue burdens and ruled in plaintiffs' favor. 8 8
Finally, in Juvelis v. Snider,28 9 the Third Circuit examined the section 504 claim of Nikitas Juvelis, "a profoundly
retarded individual," which challenged the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare's requirement of "intent to establish domicile" in order to be eligible for mental retardation services.
Because Mr. Juvelis was a minor before his placement in
Pennsylvania facilities, he was deemed a resident of his
parents' domicile, Venezuela. Mr. Juvelis lacked the mental
capacity to form an intent to remain in Pennsylvania as an
adult, and thus sought an exception to the residency policy as
a reasonable accommodation of his disability.2 9 '
Citing Easley, the Third Circuit announced that "[tihe test
to determine the reasonableness of a modification is whether it
alters the essential nature of the program or imposes an undue

28 36 F.3d at 305 (citations omitted).
28 See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987);
see supra Section I.C.2.
28 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
28 See id. at 300.

28 See supra Section I.C.l.b.

See Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991).
See supra notes 250-264 and accompanying text.
2" See Easley, 36 F.3d at 305.
28

28 See Easley, 841 F. Supp. 668.

289 68 F.3d 648 (3d Cir. 1995).
29

Id. at 651.
id. at 651-52.

211See
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burden or hardship in light of the overall program."2 92 The
Third Circuit neither cited nor analyzed the relevant HEW
regulations governing public benefits and services,2 93 nor did
it refer to the Supreme Court cases cited by the court in
29 4 for
Easley. Instead, the court relied solely upon Nathanson
the proposition that "[a]ccommodations that are 'reasonable'
must not unduly strain financial resources."29 5
As we have seen, both Easley and Nathanson erroneously
constructed an undue burdens defense where none was applicable,2 96 with the Easley decision relying upon the flawed
Nathanson decision. By relying on those cases instead of the
relevant HEW regulations, the Juvelis court failed to discover
its errors, creating more bad precedent. Fortunately, notwithstanding the undue burdens analysis, the Juvelis court ultimately ruled in plaintiffs favor, finding that the defendant
"failed to prove that a modification of its policy to allow [plaintiff] to show a change of domicile to Pennsylvania [from Venezuela] would be unduly burdensome."
Nonetheless, Juvelis further entrenched the Third Circuit's
blind adoption of the undue burdens defense under both section 504 and the ADA. And, as Juvelis itself demonstrates,
once a court creates a generic undue burdens defense, it is
unlikely to question or revisit its earlier interpretation.
The Third Circuit is not alone. In the Eighth Circuit case
of Gorman v. Bartch,297 Jeffrey Gorman, a paraplegic who
used a wheelchair, was injured while being transported by the
Kansas City police following his arrest. The police wagon was
not equipped with a wheelchair lift or wheelchair restraints.
Nevertheless, and despite Mr. Gorman's request for reasonable

at 652 (quoting Easley, 36 F.3d at 305).
Plaintiffs claim under section 504 should have been governed by the regulations governing "Health, Welfare, and Social Services," which provide no undue
burdens defense. See supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
294 Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368 (1991).
295 68 F.3d at 657 (quoting Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1368) (internal quotations
omitted). The court also referenced another Third Circuit case, Wagner v. Fair
Acres Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995). Interestingly, Wagner erroneously relied upon five of the cases we have examined-Davis, Arline, Nathanson,
Easley, and Strathie-to create an undue burdens defense in a case challenging
denial of admission to a county-operated nursing facility. See id. at 1009-17.
21 See supra notes 250-288 and accompanying text.
27 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).
292 Id.
21
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accommodations, the police simply lifted him out of his wheelchair and placed him on a bench inside of the van. The police
then used Mr. Gorman's belt to fasten him to the wall behind
8
the bench and placed a seatbelt around his waist." During
the drive to the station, the belts came loose, and Mr. Gorman
fell to the floor, suffering extensive injuries.299
Mr. Gorman brought suit alleging discrimination under
section 504 and Title II of the ADA. Examining section 504
first, the Eighth Circuit set forth the prerequisites to a section
504 claim and then broadly announced that "[dlefendants may
demonstrate as an affirmative defense that a requested accommodation would constitute an undue burden.""' For this
proposition, the court relied upon two sources: section
794a(a)(1)3 ° ' and the case of Barth v. Gelb."2 Naturally,
neither of these sources supports this assertion. Section
794a(a)(1) merely provides that the remedies, procedures, and
rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available "to
any employee or applicant for employment." °' The section further provides that, in fashioning an "affirmative action" remedy under section 791 of the Rehabilitation Act, "a court may
take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessar.y work place accommodation. . . ."" Thus, the section is
wholly inapplicable to Gorman, a case involving public benefits
and services. 0 5 The same is true of Barth, an employment
discrimination case. 0 6
Turning to the ADA, the court first explained that cases
interpreting either section 504 or the ADA "are applicable and
interchangeable," an indication of the reasoning that would
follow. The court explained that "defendants may also raise as
an affirmative defense that the requested accommodation of
the plaintiffs disability would constitute an undue burden,

2"' See id. at 909-10.

See id. at 910 ("The fall injured his shoulders and back severely enough to
require surgery and also broke his urine bag, leaving him soaked in his own
urine.").
"0 Id. at 911 (citations omitted).
29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(a)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
3" 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See Gorman, 152 F.3d at 912-13.
'"
"'

'

See Barth, 2 F.3d at 1180.
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requiring 'a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service,
program, or activity or in undue financial or administrative
burdens." 7 For support, the court cited only the DOJ regulations governing program accessibility/existing facilities." 8
Although these regulations do indeed establish a defense
based upon undue burden, they are inapplicable to Mr.
Gorman's public benefits/services claim. The court should have
examined the "[gleneral prohibitions against discrimination,"" 9 which rightfully governed Mr. Gorman's claim. These
regulations provide no defense based upon undue burden, as
Congress expressly intended."' 0 The court later identified and
applied the appropriate DOJ regulations to Mr. Gorman's
claim,3 1' but nevertheless insisted upon importing the undue
burdens defense from the wholly inapplicable regulations governing accessibility to existing buildings. As a result, the court
remanded the case to the district court, explicitly stating that
"the defendants can also raise issues of reasonable accommodation and undue burden."3 12
In Onishea v. Hopper,3" HIV-positive inmates brought
suit under section 504 challenging the policy of the Alabama
Department of Corrections ("DOC") to exclude them from participating in most of the educational, vocational, rehabilitative,
religious, and recreational programs offered in Alabama state
prisons. 314 DOC contended that high-risk behavior such as
anal intercourse, sharing drug needles, and tatooing could
occur during any of these programs without proper supervision, which created the possibility of transmission of the HIV
virus and justified the exclusion of HIV-positive inmates.3 1
The plaintiffs alleged that the DOC's concerns could be avoided
by simply hiring additional corrections officers, and, in some
cases, a single officer. 16

307Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1998)).
" See id.
3- 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1998).
310 See id.

31 See 152 F.3d at 913 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (1998)).
312 Id. at 916.

3 126 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc and vacated, 133 F.3d 1377
(11th Cir. 1998), different results reached on reh'g, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
...See id. at 1323-24.
311 See id. at 1344 (Cox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 See id. at 1338.
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Onishea, of course, had nothing to do with employment,
the only area in which the 1980 DOJ regulations cited by the
court allow for an "undue hardship" analysis.317 Citing both
Alexander and Justice Brennan's footnote in Arline, however,
the Eleventh Circuit observed that "[a] proposed accommodation.., need not be implemented if it would impose an undue
fiscal or administrative burden upon the recipient of federal
funds or would require the grantee fundamentally to alter its
program."31 To compound this error, the court added that
"[t]he reasonable accommodation and undue burden inquiries
overlap somewhat, and their precise contours are difficult to
chart."319 In truth, these concepts overlap only in the context
of employment under the DOJ regulations.'
By ignoring the distinctions that HEW and, subsequently,
DOJ carefully crafted in the implementing regulations, the
Eleventh Circuit nakedly conflated the distinct regulations,
citing the 1980 DOJ employment regulations to justify its
undue burdens analysis 2 ' and noting in an accompanying
footnote: "Although this [undue burdens] provision is located in
a section of the Department of Justice's Rehabilitation Act
regulations titled 'Employment,' the first and third factors it
suggests are equally relevant to evaluating whether an accommodation would be an undue burden in a non-employment
case."322 With this footnote, the careful distinctions drawn by
the HEW and, subsequently, the DOJ are summarily abrogated, and a defense that they explicily rejected, save in limited
circumstances, is grafted on to section 504.
Applying the undue burdens analysis, the court vacated
the district court's perfunctory finding that "any expenditure

317 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

, Onishea, 126 F.3d at 1328 (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299-302; Arline,
480 U.S. at 287 n.17).
319 Id. (citations omitted). For this proposition, the court relies upon Davis,
Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995), an employment case, and Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), which, citing Davis,
states in a footnote: "[Davis] possibly indicates that section 504 does not require
the provision of services that would impose 'undue financial and administrative
burdens' upon the recipient." 625 F.2d at 564 n.19 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
32 See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
321 See Onishea, 126 F.3d at 1339 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(c) (1998)).
'2

Id. at 1339 n.29.
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by DOC to hire additional staff would be an 'undue burden."'323 The court remanded the case, however, for a more
definite assessment of the cost of the requested accommodations, "leav[ing] open on remand the possibility that sufficient
evidence may be adduced as to the unreasonableness of adding
even a single guard ...."'
In Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities
Ass'n,3" Edward Leo Pottgen, a high school senior with a
learning disability, brought suit under section 504 and Title II
of the ADA challenging defendant's refusal to waive its age
limitation for participation in interscholastic sports."' Mr.
Pottgen petitioned defendant for a hardship exception since he
was held back due to his learning disabilities, but defendant
denied his petition.2 7
Examining Mr. Pottgen's section 504 claim first, the court
ruled that "the age limit is an essential eligibility requirement
in a high school interscholastic program."32 Among other
things, the court noted that the age limit "helps reduce the
competitive advantage flowing to teams using older athletes"
and "protects younger athletes from harm."329 "Even though
[Mr.] Pottgen [could not] meet this essential eligibility requirement," the court continued, "he is 'otherwise qualified' if reasonable accommodations would enable him to meet the age
330
limit."
The court did not look to the governing regulations to
determine the scope of defendant's obligation to accommodate
plaintiff. Instead, the court cited Brennan's footnote in Arline,
explaining that "[a]ccommodations are not reasonable if they
impose 'undue financial and administrative burdens' or if they
require a 'fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.'

33'

Based upon this standard, the court concluded that

:3 Id. at 1339.
324Id.
3- 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
32

See id. at 927.

' Pottgen played interscholastic baseball for three years in high school and
intended to play in his senior year as well. See id. at 928. Because he turned 19
shortly before his senior year, however, he was deemed ineligible. See id.
3'

Id. at 929.

329 Pottgen,

40 F.3d at 929.
(citations omitted).
Id. at 930 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17) (alteration in original).

311Id.
"
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Mr. Pottgen was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504
because waiving the age limit "would constitute a fundamental
alteration in the nature of the baseball program."33 2 Hence,
although the court erroneously cited Arline to create an undue
burdens defense, the court rejected Pottgen's section 504 claim
based upon the "fundamental alteration" standard.
Turning to Mr. Pottgen's ADA claim, the court revealed,
for the first time in the decision, the modification that Mr.
Pottgen sought: "an individualized inquiry into the necessity of
the age limit in Pottgen's case."333 As the dissent pointed out,
such an inquiry would have revealed that Mr. Pottgen was not
a threat to the safety of others and that "'any competitive advantage resulting from plaintiffs age is de minimis.'33 4 For
this reason, the dissent concluded that "[i]f an eligibility requirement can be reasonably modified to make someone eligible, that person is a qualified individual."3 35
The majority rejected this interpretation upon a pure undue burdens analysis:
The dissent's approach requires thorough evidentiary hearings at
each stage of the process. Clearly the ADA imposes no such duty.
Indeed, such an approach flies in the face of the Arline Court's statement that "[aiccommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes
'undue financial and administrative burdens' [on the public entity]
or requires
'a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] pro336
gram'"

Because the court apparently never consulted the governing
regulations, accepted the Arline dictum as binding precedent,
and applied this dictum from an employment case to a case
involving secondary education, the court concluded that the
dissent's approach "flies in the face" of the law.337 Ironically,
it is the majority's creation of an undue burden defense, and
its rejection of plaintiffs ADA claim thereupon, that flies in the
face of the law.338
SId.
"Id.

3' Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 932 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Pottgen v. Missouri St. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654, 662 n.3 (E.D. Mo. 1994)).

Id. at 933.
Id. at 931 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
''

3

Id.

'3. Rather than fear the deleterious effects of narrowly construing plaintiffs civil
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In McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n,3 39
the Sixth Circuit rejected the claim of Dion R. McPherson that,
under section 504 and Title II of the ADA, he was entitled to a
waiver of an eight-semester athletic eligibility rule. Like the
Eighth Circuit in Pottgen, the Sixth Circuit relied solely upon
the Arline dictum for the proposition that defendant need not
"grant a waiver [that] would 'impose[] undue financial and
administrative burdens... , or require[] a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.' 3 4 Disregarding the legislative history of the ADA, the express mandate of section
12134 of the ADA, and the implementing regulations, the court
explained: "most of the law that has been made in ADA cases
has arisen in the context of employment discrimination claims,
but we have no doubt that the decisional principles of these
cases may be applied to this case."34 ' One wonders why Congress, the HEW, and the DOJ even bothered to "assign[] different legal consequences to the costs of accommodation in different societal areas."34 2
Having adopted the Arline dictum, the court concluded
that requiring a waiver would not only "work a fundamental
alteration, " " but "would impose an immense financial and
administrative burden on the [defendant], by forcing it to make
'near-impossible determinations' about a particular student's
physical and athletic maturity."3 " This burden alone, the
court announced, "necessarily means that the plaintiffs requested accommodation is not reasonable."345

rights claims, the court appeared far more concerned with the potential expense
"for each individual seeking to attack a program requirement." Id. at 931 (emphasis added). The court's decision thus flies in the face of Congress' express intention
largely to preclude cost-based defenses, see supra Section II.A., the implementing
regulations, which provide no defense based upon undue burdens in education, see
supra Section II.B., and established principles of statutory construction. See supra
notes 34, 184, 197 and accompanying text.
'9 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
141 Id.
at 461 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17) (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted).
341

Id. at 460.

3'2 COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 103. See, e.g., supra notes 46-50 and accom-

panying text.
3 119 F.3d at 462.
34 Id.
3s

Id. at 463.
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34 6
Finally, in Davis v. Francis Howell School District, the
Eighth Circuit rejected the claim of Mary and Bobby Davis
that the defendant's refusal to administer their son's prescribed dose of medication violated Title II of the ADA and
section 504 of the Act.347 Unlike Pottgen and McPherson, the
court in FrancisHowell correctly cited the DOJ's general prohibitions against discrimination, which contain only the funda4
Citing both Pottgen and
mental alteration standard."
an undue burdens degrafted
court
the
McPherson, however,
49 This error proved critical, for the court
fense on to the law.
rejected plaintiffs claim based upon the undue burdens defense: "The Davises' alternative proposal that the district
waive its policy is not reasonable because it would impose
undue financial and administrative burdens on the district by
requiring it to determine the safety of the dosage and the likecase."350
lihood of future harm and liability in each individual
Davis gave birth to Arline, which spawned Pottgen and
McPherson, leading to FrancisHowell. Bad decisions make bad
decisions.

IV. OLMSTEAD V. ZIMRING
Coincidentally, as this article was being prepared, the
Supreme Court ruled for the first time on the issue of cost
5
under Title II of the ADA in Olmstead v. Zimring."' Unfortunately, the Supreme Court once again got it wrong. This time,
however, the Court did not do so merely in dictum, and it did
35 2
not do so by directly following Davis or Arline. Rather, following the lower court's lead, the Court created a novel yet
equally improper cost-based defense by erroneously conflating
the undue burdens and fundamental alteration defenses under
the DOJ regulations and by citing the wrong regulations.

: 138 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 1998).
...See id. at 755.
3 See id. at 756 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998)).
"' See id. at 756-57.
...Id. at 757 (citations omitted).
a51119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
The Court did,
252 Interestingly, the Court did not even cite Davis or Arline.
however, largely follow the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning. The Eleventh Circuit, in
turn, based its cost-based defense on another Eleventh Circuit case that erroneously cited Davis for this proposition. See infra notes 364-370 and accompanying text.
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In Olmstead, plaintiffs alleged that the State of Georgia
violated their rights under Title II of the ADA by failing to
place them in community-based programs once their treating
professionals determined that such placement was appropriate. 53 In particular, plaintiffs alleged that defendant violated
section 35.130(d) of the DOJ regulations, which provides: "A
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." 354 Among other things, the
defendant responded that the plaintiffs' ADA claim must fail
because the denial of community-based placement was based
on a lack of funds, not on plaintiffs' disabilities. 55
Granting summary judgement in favor of the plaintiffs,
the district court found that the defendant's failure to place the
plaintiffs in an appropriate community-based program, rather
than confining them in a state hospital, violated Title II of the
ADA. The court also ruled that "the denial of community placements could not be justified by the State's purported lack of
funds ... ."35 In affirming, the Eleventh Circuit correctly observed that "[t]he State's argument that its lack of funds
makes its refusal to provide integrated services non-discriminatory is inconsistent with the ADA's statutory scheme and
would permit a public entity to justify is refusal to comply with
3 57
the ADA by asserting that it lacked the money to do so."
"Moreover," the court explained, "the plain language of the
ADA's Title II regulations, as well as the ADA's legislative
history, make clear that Congress wanted to permit a cost
defense only in the most limited of circumstances."3 58
The Eleventh Circuit even cited the correct DOJ regulations, explaining that under section 35.130(b)(7), a state may
justify its failure to make reasonable modifications only when
those modifications "would fundamentally alter the nature of
the service, program, or activity."'359 In addition, the court
cited the House Judiciary Report on the ADA, which states:

"o See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2178.
354 28 C.F.R. §35.130(d) (1998).
'
"'

Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 895.

3" Id.
358 Id.

at 902.

...Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998)).
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"'The fact that it is more convenient, either administratively or
fiscally, to provide services in a segregated manner, does not
constitute a valid justification for separate or different services
Finally, the
under Section 504 ... or under this title ...
court explained that, "[u]nder the ADA, as with other federal
statutes, 'inadequate state appropriations do not excuse
3
noncompliance' with federal law." "' It appeared, then, that
the Eleventh Circuit was correctly rejecting a cost-based defense under the "plain language" of the DOJ regulations and
362
the "clear" legislative history.
Anomalously, however, on the final page of its decision,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court improperly
failed to consider "whether treating [plaintiffs] would require
additional expenditures, and if so, whether the State had met
its burden of proving that those expenditures were unreason36 3
able in light of the State's mental health budget." The only
authority the court cited for an examination of this "burden"
was United States v. Board of Trustees for the University of
Alabama," a secondary education case in which plaintiff
sought accommodations in the provision of auxiliary aids and
transportation under section 504. Although the court in Board
of Trustees ruled for the plaintiff, it nevertheless erroneously
applied the "'undue financial or administrative burdens'" de3 65 and liftfense in assessing plaintiff's claim for interpreters
66 As we have seen, the relevant HEW
equipped bus service.
regulations governing secondary education do not provide for a
defense based upon "undue financial and administrative burdens." 6 ' The court did not, however, consult the applicable

" Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 902 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50
(1990)); see supra note 222.
3. Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 904 (quoting Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris,
617 F.2d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 1980)) (other citations omitted).
3'

Id. at 902.

Id. at 905
3" 908 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1990).
:- See id. at 748.
3' See id. at 751.
30 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.31-104.47 (1998); supra notes 46-66, 262-263 and accompanying text.
'3
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regulations in establishing this defense; instead, it blindly
cited Davis and, even more improbably, Alexander,368 for
this defense." 9
In Olmstead, then, the Eleventh Circuit repeated its error
in Board of Trustees, this time citing only that decision, and
neither Davis nor Alexander (nor, for that matter, the controlling regulations) for the establishment of a cost-based defense
in the area of public benefits and services, this time under the
ADA. Thus, after expressly recognizing that "Congress wanted
to permit a cost defense only in the most limited circumstances," the court completely failed to recognize that those circumstances do not include public benefits and services claims under Title II of the ADA.37
Of even greater significance, the court confounded the
undue financial burdens and fundamental alteration defenses
set forth in the DOJ regulations: "Unless the State can prove
that requiring it to make these additional expenditures would
be so unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental
health budget that it would fundamentally alter the service it
provides, the ADA requires the State to make these additional
expenditures."37 ' The court then remanded the case for, inter
alia, consideration of the question: "whether the additional expenditures... would be unreasonable given the demands of
the State's mental health budget."372 Citing only Board of
Trustees, a flawed secondary education case brought under
section 504 (rather than the ADA), the Eleventh Circuit thus
grafted an undue financial burdens defense onto the district
fundamental alteration defense under the ADA, notwithstanding Congress' and the DOJ's explicit rejection of a cost-based
defense in public benefits and services claims under Title II
(and notwithstanding decades of clear distinction between
these defenses).
The Supreme Court compounded the Eleventh Circuit's
error. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg accepted and
even amplified the cost-based defense that the Eleventh CirSee
See
U.S. 397
171 See

supra note 264.
908 F. 2d at 751 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
(1979); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
infra notes 393-394 and accompanying text.
" Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998).

"

372

Id.
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cuit fabricated under section 35.130(b)(7) of the DOJ regulations. Indeed, the Court held that the Eleventh Circuit's remand as to cost was "unduly restrictive," since it only permitted consideration of the cost of providing community-based
care to the litigants.3 "In evaluating a State's fundamentalalteration defense," the Court ruled, "the District Court must
consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not
only the cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others
with mental disabilities, and the State's obligation to mete out
those services equitably." 4
The Court did not rely on any authority for this novel and
unsupported defense. The Court never questioned the Eleventh
Circuit's authority to erect this defense under section
5
35.130(b)(7) of the DOJ regulations," and the Court never
6
examined Board of Trustees," the case upon which the Eleventh Circuit premised its consideration of cost in Olmstead.
Furthermore, the Court ignored the unequivocal legislative
history evincing Congress' intent to preclude a cost-based defense in public benefits and services claims under Title II. The
Court likewise completely ignored the overall scheme of the
DOJ regulations, which expressly distinguish between the
undue financial burdens defense and the fundamental alteration defense, conspicuously omitting the former in section
35.130(b)(7).
Consider, for example, section 35.150(a)(3), the parallel
regulation governing program accessibility to existing facilities.
It expressly provides that a public entity is not required "to
take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or
activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.
', Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 (1999) "If . . . the expense entailed in placing one or two people in a community-based treatment program is
properly measured for reasonableness against the State's entire mental health
budget," the Court explained, "it is unlikely that a State, relying on the fundamental-alteration defense, could ever prevail." Id. at 2188.
...Id. at 2185.
17' This is a glaring omission considering that both the Eleventh Circuit and
the Supreme Court deviated from the established principle that cost is generally
not a defense to civil rights claims. See supra notes 184, 211 and accompanying
text; see also supra notes 34, 197 and accompanying text.
171 United States v. Board of Trustees, 908 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1990).
3" 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1998) (emphasis added); see also supra note 135
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Under this regulation, the public entity has the burden of
proving that compliance "would result in such alteration or
burdens." 78 This distinction exists not only in the regulations
but in the case law as well: in Arline, for example, the Court
expressly stated that "[aiccomodation is not reasonable if it
either imposes 'undue financial and administrative burdens' on
a grantee, or requires 'a fundamental alteration in the nature
of [the] program.'" '
Quite simply, under section 35.130(b)(7), the question is
whether "making the modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of the service, program, or activity," not whether
the cost of making the modifications would do so.3"' The Supreme Court, through judicial fiat, has inserted into the regulations a defense that is not only absent from the controlling
regulation, but that Congress and the DOJ expressly and purposefully omitted.
The court's interpretation of section 35.130(b)(7) is, in
addition, contrary to the plain meaning of that regulation.
Section 35.130(b)(7) expressly provides for a defense when
"making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the [singular] service, program, or activity.""' In
Olmstead, however, the Supreme Court ruled that in assessing
this defense, courts must look at the "range of services the
State provides" and "the State's obligation to mete out those
services equitably."3 M Hence, the Court has not only created
a cost-based defense under section 35.130(b)(7), but it has
fundamentally altered the language of the regulation, providing for a defense if the state's "range of services" would be
fundamentally altered, rather than the service, program, or
activity at issue." 3

and accompanying text.
3- 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
...School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see supra note 179 and accompanying text; see
also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
38028 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
381Id. (emphasis added).
'"
Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 (1999).
'"
Indeed, when quoting the regulations, the Court conspicuously omitted the
last five words of the regulation which refer to "the service, program, or activity."
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (emphasis added). The Court then paraphrased these
words, replacing "or" with "and" and turning the singular into the plural, trans-
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Finally, as in many of the cases examined in Part III of
this Article, in reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court
simply read the wrong regulations to support the imposition of
a cost-based defense. In a footnote, the Court explained: "We
reject the Court of Appeals' construction of the reasonablemodifications regulation for another reason." " Specifically,
Congress ordered that the DOJ regulations "'shall be consistent with' the regulations in part 41 of Title 28 of the Code of
Federal Regulations implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, "385 i.e., the HEW's prototype regulations, which became,
pursuant to Executive Order, the DOJ's coordinating regulations.386 Citing the DOJ's coordinating regulations governing
employment cases, the Court observed:
The § 504 regulation upon which the reasonable-modifications regulations is based provides now, as it did at the time the ADA was
enacted:
"A recipient shall make reasonable accomodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped
applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the
accomodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
its program."387

This is an egregious error. Congress expressly limited the
defense of "undue hardship" under the ADA to the areas of
employment and program access in existing facilities. As the
House Committee on the Judiciary explicitly observed: "The
specific sections on employment and program access in existing
facilities are subject to the 'undue hardship' and 'undue
burden' provisions of the regulations which are incorporated
in[to] [the ADA]. No other limitationshould be implied in other
areas.""' As we have seen, Congress expressly clarified this
point in the statute itself.389 In Olmstead, the Court simply ig-

forming the words into "the State's services and programs." Olmstead, 119 S. Ct.
at 2188 ("The DOJ regulation allows States to resist modifications that entail a
'fundamenta[] alter[ationl' of the States' services and programs.") (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7)).
Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2190 n.16.
3" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b)).
3" See supra note 51.

Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2190 n.16 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.53).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3., at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 473 (emphasis added); see supra note 222 and accompanying text.
...See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
37
31
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ignored or disregarded Congress' expressed intent, importing
this defense into a public benefits and services case.
Compounding its own error, the Court then cited the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regulations governing employment for a definition of undue hardship,39 ° citing, in addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services' regulations governing employment under section
504.391 Upon this flawed authority, the Court concluded that,
"[u]nder the Court of Appeals' restrictive reading, the reasonable-modifications regulation would impose a standard substantially more difficult for the State to meet than the 'undue
burden' standard imposed by the corresponding § 504 regulation."3 92 The whole point is that the "corresponding" regulation under section 504 is that which governs health, welfare,
and social services, not employment, and it does not provide for
a defense based upon "undue burden."3 93 Once again, the
Court failed or refused to acknowledge that the section 504
regulations "assign[] different legal consequences to the costs
of accomodation in different societal areas."394
Olmstead encapsulates, in one case, many of the errors in
interpretation that have lead to the improper application of the
undue burdens defense. These include ignoring the relevant
regulations, citing the wrong regulations, citing Davis and its
progeny as binding precedent in inapplicable contexts, and
blindly citing cases without analyzing the source of their pronouncements on cost. Olmstead adds a new twist, however,
improperly creating an undue burdens defense out of the distinct fundamental alteration defense. Olmstead is on the
books, but it is fundamentally incorrect under the law. It will
be up to advocates to continue to resist this unprincipled and
unsupported defense, and to force the Supreme Court finally to
get it right.

See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2190 n.16 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(c) (1998)).
...See id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1998)).
392 Id.
"'

3' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
3" COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 103; see supra notes 49, 342 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Civil rights statutes such as the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA are to be construed broadly to effectuate their remedial purpose. 9 5 In addition, the protections afforded by such
96
statutes are generally not limited by considerations of cost.
One would therefore expect courts derogating from these principles, and construing the statutes narrowly on the grounds of
undue expenditure, to marshall and cite convincing evidence in
favor of their decisions.
As we have seen, however, such justification is impossible
since there is no statutory, regulatory, or common law basis for
the defense of undue financial burden in most factual contexts
under the disability statutes and their implementing regulations. The failure of courts and advocates to recognize this fact
is no mere intellectual curiosity or historical relic; adoption of
this defense under wholly inappropriate circumstances continues to this day, significantly curtailing the rights of the disabled. Quite simply, the emperor has no clothes. It is time to
dress the disability statutes in the full protections that Congress and the administrative agencies charged with implementing the statutes intended. This may, at times, require
courts and advocates to challenge "established" precedent and
to consider carefully the relevant statutory and regulatory
frameworks. But if we are to achieve Congress' stated goal of
"assuring] equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such [disabled]
individuals, " ' we must do nothing less.

"

3
"'

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999).

